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The United States Supreme Court held in PLIVA v. Mensing that federal
preemption immunizes generic drug manufacturers from liability for state law
failure-to-warn claims.' As a result, consumers harmed by a mislabeled generic
drug will be unable to bring actions against generic manufacturers under state
law. The Court confessed that the resulting federal drug-labeling scheme dealt
consumers an "unfortunate hand." 2 By removing generic manufacturers' duty to
improve the adequacy of their products' warning labels, the Supreme Court calls
into question the safety of generic drugs.
This Article explores the unfortunate hand that PLIVA dealt generic drug
consumers and proposes a framework to increase the odds that generic drug
consumers are provided with safe, effective, and adequately labeled generic
drugs. To fully understand how PLIVA recasts the generic manufacturers' safety
obligations to consumers, this Article begins with a discussion about the approval
process for brand-name and generic drugs and the corresponding manufacturer
responsibilities. In particular, this Article focuses on manufacturers' post-
approval responsibilities. Next, the discussion examines how PLIVA
substantively alters generic manufacturers' post-approval responsibilities and
weakens the safety provisions in the drug-labeling framework. This Article then
explores the implications this compromised framework could have on consumers,
patients, physicians, pharmacists, and states. This Article offers a regulatory
framework to remedy the deficiencies created by PLIVA. In doing so, the
argument addresses anticipated criticisms and illustrates how the proposed
framework fulfills the Hatch-Waxman Act's goal of providing consumers with
safe generic drugs.
Changes to the generic drug-labeling framework were instantiated after the
Supreme Court determined the validity of the impossibility defense asserted by
generic manufacturers to consumer state law failure-to-warn claims. Specifically,
the PLIVA Court focused its preemptive lens on the regulatory requirements that
govern generic manufacturers' post-approval labeling responsibilities.3 This
scrutiny assessed whether the federal regulations imposing a duty on generic
manufacturers to maintain warning labels identical to their branded counterparts
conflicted with, and therefore preempted, the state law duty to continuously
change their warnings in order to produce increasingly safe labels.4 The Court
concluded that the structure of the federal regulatory requirements rendered it
impossible for generic manufacturers to comply with both.s
1. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2577-78 (2011).
2. Id at 2581.
3. Id at 2575-77.
4. Id. at 2577.
5. Id.
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By finding preemption grounded in "impossibility," the Court settled much
of the debate over the validity of generic manufacturers' preemption defense.
This debate touched on several important legal and moral issues: the appropriate
level of judicial deference to agency pronouncements, the scope of State
authority to protect citizens through the availability of product liability lawsuits,6
and the existence of factual predicates for drug manufacturers to claim
preemption.7 In this respect, PLIVA resolved the question regarding the right of
consumers to bring state-level failure-to-warn claims against generic drug
manufacturers.
PLIVA exposes, but leaves unresolved, a more fundamental regulatory
concern. A central premise of the federal drug regulatory framework is that "the
manufacturer bears responsibility for the content of its label at all times." 8
Inherent in this responsibility is the federal requirement that generic
manufacturers monitor the safety of their products.9 Nevertheless, generic
manufacturers' labeling requirements are bound by a regulatory scheme that is
devoid of any formal requirements setting forth generic manufacturers' duty to
initiate a label change to warn consumers.'o The regulations also fail to articulate
a label-changing process if a generic manufacturer wants to provide consumers
with more accurate and timely product-labeling information." Against this
backdrop, PLIVA further erodes generic manufacturers' nebulous labeling duties,
by inoculating them against liability in situations in which they do not take steps
to comply with state law requirements to strengthen their drugs' safety labels.
While the need to address the inadequacies of the regulations governing
generic manufacturers' post-approval duties is exacerbated by the Court's
holding in PLIVA, fissures in the generic-labeling framework are longstanding.
Prior to PLIVA, consumers faced divergent federal court interpretations regarding
generic manufacturers' obligation to comply with state law duty-to-warn
requirements. 12 The split among the circuits intensified after the Supreme Court's
holding in Wyeth v. Levine. This decision seemingly sounded the death knell for
brand-name manufacturers' preemption defense to state law failure-to-warn
claims when it rejected a similar preemption argument on behalf of brand-name
manufacturers.' 3 Although the case did not directly reference generic
6. James M. Beck, Federal Preemption in FDA-Regulated Product-Liability Litigation: Where
We Are and Where We Might Be Headed, 32 HAMLINE L. REv. 657, 684-87 (2009); Margaret
Gilhooley, Drug Preemption and the Need To Reform the FDA Consultation Process, 34 AM. J.L.
& MED. 535, 536 (2008).
7. Lesley A. Stout, Making Changes: Generic Drug Labeling and the Case Against Federal
Preemption, 98 Ky. L.J. 623, 636-44 (2010).
8. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2576 (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 570-71 (2009)).
9. Id. at 2586 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
10. Id at 2582 (majority opinion).
11. Id.
12. See discussion infra Section II.A.
13. Wyeth, 555 U.S. 555.
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GENERIC DRUGS
manufacturers, a majority of circuits extended the Court's preemption exclusion
to generic manufacturers. 14
In PLIVA, the Supreme Court distinguished the error in such an application.
The Court explained that "the federal statutes and regulations that apply to brand-
name drug manufacturers are meaningfully different than those that apply to
generic drug manufacturers." 5 As articulated by the FDA, the Supreme Court
held that tools permitting brand-name manufacturers to change unilaterally their
labels are not available to generic manufacturers.' 6 The practical effect of such a
determination is twofold. First, generic manufacturers are prohibited statutorily
from preventing consumer injury by independently strengthening inadequate
warning labels on their products. Second, the ability of an injured consumer to
bring a failure-to-warn claim against a drug manufacturer turns on "the
happenstance" of whether the consumer's pharmacist dispensed the brand-name
or generic version of the drug.'7 The Court conceded that such a finding results in
a federal drug scheme that deals generic consumers an "unfortunate hand." 8
After this acknowledgement, however, the opinion ends.
This Article picks up where the Supreme Court's decision left off, by
exploring the implications of PLIVA for individual consumers and drug safety in
general. Specifically, the Court's opinion creates a schism in the complementary
federal and state regulatory schemes. This may lead to situations in which no
manufacturer has the legal responsibility or ability to make the necessary changes
to improve warnings; such manufacturers also may not be able to warn
consumers and healthcare providers. Moreover, PLIVA reinforces regulatory
deficiencies that dramatically reduce the awareness of the FDA and drug
manufacturers of adverse consumer reactions to generic and brand-name
medications. Further, the Court's opinion may have the chilling effect of
diminishing consumer confidence in the safety and effectiveness of generic
drugs. In refusing to concede the finality of this decision, this Article proposes a
regulatory framework that enables generic manufacturers to meet unilaterally
their primary responsibility to provide safe and effective drugs to consumers by
equipping them with the tools necessary to address labeling concerns.
Part I provides an overview of the drug approval process. Section A of this
Part examines the regulatory framework that defines the pre- and post-approval
processes for brand-name drugs. Section B provides similar background about
the approval procedures for generic drugs. Part II offers a focused analysis of the
regulatory framework that defines generic manufacturers' post-approval labeling
14. See Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharm. Co., 630 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2011); Demahy v. Actavis, Inc.,
593 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2010); Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2009).
15. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2582.
16. Id. at 2575.
17. Id. at 2583.
18. Id. at 2581.
213
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responsibilities, explores the duties of generic manufacturers in the wake of
PLIVA, and examines the probable implications that truncated regulatory
requirements will have on consumers, healthcare providers, and states. Section A
of Part III highlights problems in the current regulatory framework by explaining
how, at critical junctures of the generic drug's pre- and post-approval life cycle,
manufacturers are denied data, consultation opportunities, and adequate access to
compliance mechanisms. Finally, Section B articulates a practical framework in
which generic manufacturers will have the necessary tools to fulfill their
responsibility to provide consumers and the medical community with current and
accurate labeling instructions for their products.
I. DRUG APPROVAL PROCESS
To appreciate the need for a more responsive legal and regulatory
framework for generic drug manufacturers, it is necessary to explore the current
drug approval process and how it incorporates generic drugs. In 1938, Congress
enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).' 9 This Act granted
the FDA exclusive authority to regulate the prescription drug industry.20
Accordingly, it is the FDA's responsibility to ensure that drugs are safe,
effective,2' and not mislabeled. 2 2 To this end, the FDA is the principal
governmental authority that establishes the regulations governing the
manufacture, sale, and labeling of prescription drugs.2 3
A. Brand-Name Drug Approval and Labeling Process
1. Pre-approval
Pursuant to the FDCA, all drug manufacturers must receive FDA approval
before they introduce a new drug on the market. 24 For brand-name drugs, this
requires the manufacturer to submit a new drug application (NDA) to the FDA.
The NDA must contain information about the drug's safety and efficacy, which
must be supported by data from clinical trials.2 5 The manufacturer must also
provide proposed labeling that reflects the appropriate drug use and warns about
26potential dangers and adverse reactions associated with the drug.
19. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399D (1938)).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).
21. Id
22. Id § 355(d).
23. Id §§ 321(n), 331(a)-(b), (k), 352, 355, 393(b)(2)(B).
24. Id § 355(a).
25. Id § 355(a)-(b), (d).
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Under the FDCA, labeling comprises "all labels and other written, printed,
or graphic matters (1) upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2)
accompanying such article."27 Also, courts have interpreted labeling to include
product advertising attendant to the product. 28 A drug label that contains false,
misleading, or inadequate information will be rejected by the FDA on the basis
that the drug is mislabeled.29
To avoid rejection, brand-name manufacturers work closely with the FDA
during the NDA approval process to determine the appropriate labeling for the
drug.30 Side effects, contraindications, and relevant hazards are extensively
discussed between the manufacturer and the FDA in order to satisfy its
requirement that the label includes warnings of known risks based on scientific
evidence. 31 During this process, the FDA takes careful steps to omit risks that are
inadequately supported by the scientific research.32 Ultimately, the FDA
determines what information is included in the labeling and the exact final
version of the instructions.33 Because drug labeling provides doctors and other
medical professionals with information needed to make informed prescription
decisions, the FDA's review of new drugs and their labels typically takes years. 34
Under federal law, therefore, the evaluation of a drug's safety and effectiveness
is inextricably linked with the drug's labeling.3 5
2. Post-approval
Scrutiny of a drug's labeling does not end with FDA approval of the NDA.
Drug manufacturers have a continued responsibility to maintain accurate labeling
information.36 This ongoing responsibility is rooted in several factors. During the
pre-approval phase, the drug is tested on relatively small cohorts-generally,
between six hundred and three thousand research subjects-and only for a
27. 21 U.S.C. § 321(m).
28. Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 350 (1948).
29. 21 U.S.C. § 352(a), (f).
30. Brief for Amicus Curiae The United States of America at 5, Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432
F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (No. 05-5500), 2006 WL 1724170 [hereinafter Colacicco Amicus]
(noting that drug manufacturers and the FDA collaborate extensively when deciding about the
content of proposed drug labeling).
31. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.56(a), 201.57(c).
32. See Colacicco Amicus, supra note 30, at 7-8.
33. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.56(a), 201.57(c).
34. Michael Dickson & Jean Paul Gagnon, Key Factors in the Rising Cost of New Drug
Discovery and Development, 3 NATURE REVIEWS 417, 418 (2004) (estimating that research,
development, testing, FDA review, and approval of a new drug take a minimum of three years).
35. See New Drug and Antibiotic Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7470 (Feb. 22, 1985)
("Drug labeling serves as the standard under which FDA determines whether a product is safe and
effective.").
36. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a)-(b), (k) (2006).
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limited time period that is rarely in excess of two years.37 As a result, pre-
approval testing cannot readily detect adverse effects that occur infrequently,
have long latency periods, or affect populations that are underrepresented.38
Further, because underrepresented subgroups rarely provide sufficient data to
permit refined analysis, the FDA's assessment of a drug's risks is performed on a
population-wide, rather than on a subgroup-by-subgroup, basis. 9 In light of these
limitations, the resulting FDA-approved labels cannot guarantee that a drug will
not cause serious, unexpected adverse effects, even if properly used for the
approved purposes. 40 To monitor the unanticipated adverse events, the FDA
requires all manufacturers to submit adverse event reports to it.4 1
In the premarketing phase, the FDA is the exclusive authority for
determining the adequacy and approval of the drug's label.42 The FDA's
authority rests in part on its expertise in evaluating the studies provided by the
manufacturer. 43 However, in the postmarket world, the burden rests squarely on
the manufacturer to ensure that its labeling is adequate. In part, this shift in
responsibility reflects the decreased data that the FDA receives regarding
postmarket drug testing. For example, manufacturers are not required to provide
the FDA with evaluations of the drug's performance in the market or assessments
of the drug's safety profile after approval." Even if such an ongoing obligation
were to exist, the FDA might still lack sufficient manpower to make meaningful
use of these data, in light of chronic resource constraints. 4 5
37. David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA's Efforts To
Preempt Failure-to- Warn Claims, 96 GEo. L.J. 461, 471 (2008).
38. INST. MED. NAT'L AcAD., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE
HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 37-38 (Alina Baciu et al. eds., 2006).
39. Most clinical studies can detect drug-related injuries that occur at a rate between I in 500
and 1 in 1000. "Yet, if the drug is used by 200,000 people ... a serious adverse event appearing in
as few as one in 10,000 people is very significant, since it would occur 20 times. These rare
reactions can be identified only after a drug has been widely used." William B. Schultz, How To
Improve Drug Safety, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2004, http://washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A26865-2004Dec l.html.
40. Jason Lazarou et al., Incidence ofAdverse Drug Reactions in Hospitalized Patents: A Meta
Analysis ofProspective Studies, 279 JAMA 1200, 1202 (1998) (explaining that the FDA recognizes
that even the most up-to-date, informative labels cannot avert adverse reactions); Kessler &
Vladeck, supra note 37, at 471-72.
41. 21 C.F.R § 314.80(b) (2011) (discussing postmarketing reporting obligations for NDA
applicants); id. § 314.98 (discussing postmarketing reporting obligations for ANDA applicants).
42. 21 U.S.C. § 355(n) (2006). The day of approval is when the FDA is in the best position to
comment on the drug's safety and efficacy. During the approval process, the FDA has had access
to, and has invested considerable resources in, reviewing all available health and safety data
pertaining to the drug.
43. Id § 355(b)(1).
44. Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 37, at 492.
45. For example, the FDA's Office of Drug Safety-the unit responsible for monitoring
adverse events that arise with the three thousand prescription, and approximately eight thousand
over-the-counter, drugs that the FDA has approved-is staffed with one hundred professional
employees. FDA's Drug Approval Process: Up to the Challenge? Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
216
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As the maker and seller of the product, the primary responsibility to ensure
that the drug is safe as and effective is rightly placed on the manufacturer. 46 To
this end, there are detailed procedures that regulate postmarket modifications to a
drug's labeling.47 For example, the brand-name manufacturer is required to
conduct extensive postmarketing surveillance. 48 This includes review and
analysis of reported adverse events and published medical and scientific
literature.49 The FDA requires brand-name manufacturers to disclose any relevant
information discovered through this process-including information contained in
the adverse reports regarding any version of their product.50 In addition, the FDA
commonly requires brand-name manufacturers to conduct follow-up phase IV
clinical studies after selling their product.5 ' This analysis is conducted against the
backdrop of the knowledge the manufacturer obtained during the clinical trials
52and other research conducted throughout the NDA approval process.
a. Mechanisms for Postmarket Modifications: Prior Approval
Supplement
FDA regulations require brand-name manufacturers to provide additional
warning labels "as soon as there is reasonable evidence of a causal association" 53
between the drug and the clinically significant hazard. The procedure for making
these changes is set forth in 21 C.F.R. § 314.7054 and includes the Prior Approval
Supplement (PAS) and Changes Being Effected (CBE) mechanisms. 5 The PAS
Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 109th Cong. 11 tbl. (2005). In contrast, more than one
thousand employees in the FDA's Office of New Drugs are involved in the review of a few dozen
N DAs a year. Ensuring Drug Safety: Where Do We Go From Here?: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 109th Cong. 42 (2005) (statement of Dr. Bruce S. Patsy).
46. Brent R. Gibson et al., The U.S. Drug Safety System: Role of the Pharmaceutical Industry,
17 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 110, 110-14 (2008).
47. Federal law requires brand-name manufacturers to file "postmarketing reports" with the
FDA, notifying it of any serious and unexpected adverse incidents suffered by a user of the drug.
See 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (2009). In addition, manufacturers are required to submit annual reports
detailing any other significant new information that might affect the safety, effectiveness, or
labeling of the product. Id. § 314.81.
48. Id § 314.80(b) (2011).
49. 21 U.S.C. § 355(k) (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 314.80.
50. 21 U.S.C. § 355(k); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(b).
51. 21 C.F.R. § 314.510; FDA, CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RES. (CDER), CTR. FOR
BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RES., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: POSTMARKETING STUDIES AND CLINICAL
TRIALS - IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 505(o)(3) OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT
3, nn.8-9 (2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance
Regulatorylnformation/Guidances/UCM172001.pdf [hereinafter Clinical Trials Guidance].
52. 21 C.F.R. § 314.510 (2011). During the period of market exclusivity, the brand-name
manufacturer effectively has a monopoly not only on the market for the drug, but also on the
accumulated data.
53. Id. § 201.57(c)(6)(i) (2006).
54. Id. § 314.70 (2011).
55. Id. § 314.70(b).
217
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mechanism applies to "major changes" to an approved drug and requires
manufacturers to submit a supplemental application to the FDA for approval
prior to making significant changes to the approved product.16 While PAS
provisions enable certain labeling modifications, they expressly exclude labeling
changes to "add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse
reaction."57 Accordingly, manufacturers may not use the PAS mechanism to
propose new warnings. Instead, the PAS strictly limits labeling changes to those
that are necessitated by post-approval modifications, such as "qualitative or
quantitative formulation of the drug product, including inactive ingredients" 8
that were listed on the original labeling.
b. Mechanisms for Postmarket Modifications: Changes Being Effected
The CBE mechanism also allows brand-name manufacturers to make
postmarket modifications to their products' labeling.59 This provision gives
brand-name manufacturers the ability to delete from any label "false, misleading,
or unsupported indications"60 about the drug's use or effectiveness. Upon
learning of a clinically significant hazard, a drug manufacturer can also
unilaterally "add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or
adverse reaction,"6' without first obtaining FDA approval. This safety valve
mechanism enables drug manufacturers to make post-approval label changes
immediately to inadequately labeled products and inform doctors and patients
about the new information. 62 Through the CBE process, brand-name
manufacturers may independently incorporate the latest safety information into
their labels and quickly apprise the public of product changes.
c. Mechanisms for Postmarket Modifications: "Dear Doctor" Letters
A third way branded manufacturers can provide updated warnings about
their products is through direct mailings to healthcare providers, commonly
referred to as "Dear Doctor" letters. 63 These letters constitute a regulated
56. Id
57. Id § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A).
58. Id § 314.70(b)(2)(i).
59. Id. § 314.70(c)(3).
60. Id. § 516.161(b)(1)(B) (2008).
61. Id. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A).
62. The regulations, however, require the manufacturer to inform the FDA immediately of the
change and to file a Supplemental New Drug Application at least thirty days prior to distributing
the drug with the labeling changes.
63. 21 C.F.R. § 200.5 (2001); Labeling and Prescription Drug Advertising; Content and
Format for Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,447 (June 26, 1979)
(codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 202); see FDA, CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RES., OFFICE OF
NEW DRUGS, MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (MAPP) 6020.10: NDAs: "DEAR HEALTH
218
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"labeling" under the statute and case law.M Accordingly, they are subject to the
same standards that govern all labeling, including the "misbranding" label
provisions.
B. Generic Drug Approval and Labeling Process
1. Pre-approval
In 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act, commonly referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Hatch-Waxman Act), to aid generic drugs
in coming to market as quickly as possible after the expiration of a brand-name
patent.65 This legislation created an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA)
for generic drugs that eliminated the need for generic manufacturers to repeat the
expensive and time-consuming clinical drug trials conducted by brand-name
manufacturers.66 The Hatch-Waxman Act permits ANDA applicants to rely on
the FDA's approval of the brand-name drug so long as the generic manufacturer
establishes that the generic drug (1) is bioequivalent to its branded counterpart;
(2) has the same route of administration, active ingredients, strength, and dosage
form as the listed drug;6 7 and (3) has the same labeling as that of the approved
drug. 68 Because brand-name manufacturers hold their production processes as
trade secrets, generic manufacturers demonstrate bioequivalence 69 through
independent expertise. Accordingly, to formulate their drugs, generic
manufacturers conduct both laboratory and clinical testing to ensure that their
products are absorbed in the same manner as their branded counterparts. 70 They
must also comply with the same elaborate chemical manufacturing controls as
brand-name manufacturers. As a result, generic companies develop their own
proprietary manufacturing processes.7 1 These clinical bioequivalence studies
CARE PROFESSIONAL" LETTERS 2 (2003), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/
CentersOffices/CDER/ManualofPoliciesProcedures/ucm82012.pdf (establishing protocols for
FDA review of such correspondence).
64. 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (2006); see also Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 350 (1948); 21
C.F.R. § 202.1(a)(1)(2) (2011).
65. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355) (1984).
66. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j).
67. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii).
68. 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8) (2008); see Zeneca, Inc. v. Shalala, 213 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir.
2000) (citing 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(2)(A)(V)).
69. 21 C.F.R. § 320.1(e) (defining bioequivalence as "the absence of a significant difference in
the rate and extent to which the active ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceutical equivalents or
pharmaceutical alternatives becomes available at the site of drug action when administered at the
same molar dose under similar conditions in an appropriately designed study").
70. Id §§ 210-11.
71. Id §§ 314.50(d)(1), 314.94(a)(9).
219
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require ANDA applicants to submit one or more bioequivalence studies in which
human subjects are given the generic product, and drug concentrations in the
blood are assessed statistically. 72 The Hatch-Waxman Act, however, does not
require applicants to submit clinical or nonclinical evidence to substantiate the
safety and effectiveness of the active ingredients.
By requiring generic manufacturers only to prove bioequivalence and to
maintain the same label as its branded counterpart, Congress intended a relatively
inexpensive and streamlined approval process.73 The resulting regulatory
framework eliminated the need to conduct clinical trials because, as Congress
noted, such trials would not only be "unnecessary and wasteful because the drug
has already been determined to be safe and effective," 74 but also would be
"unethical because [trials] require[] that some sick patients take placebos and be
denied treatment known to be effective."75
The 1992 regulations implementing the Hatch-Waxman Act's ANDA
requirements reiterated that labeling proposed for the generic must be "the same
as" 7 6 the label of its branded counterpart.77 This provision of the Hatch-Waxman
Act illustrates the central premise of the ANDA process: that generic drugs are to
be relied upon as the therapeutic equivalent of the listed drug.78 The FDA places
a high priority on ensuring consistency in labeling in order to minimize any cause
for confusion among health care professionals and consumers and prevent a lack
of confidence in the equivalency of generic versus brand-name products.79
As part of the ANDA approval process, a generic manufacturer submits the
following information: the proposed labeling for its product;80 proof that the
"conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested"81 in the labeling of
the generic drug have been previously approved for the brand-name drug;
materials for a side-by-side comparison of the proposed labeling to the brand-
name drug;82 and a statement affirming that the generic labeling is the same as
72. Barbara M. Davit et al., Comparing Generic and Innovator Drugs: A Review of 12 years of
Bioequivalence Data from the United States Food and Drug Administration, 14 ANNALS
PHARMACOTHERAPY 1583, 1584 (2009).
73. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355) (1984).
74. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1 (1984) ("The purpose of. . . the bill is to make available more
low cost generic drugs by establishing a generic drug approval procedure for pioneer drugs . . .
75.1d
76. The FDA has defined "same as" to mean "identical." 21 C.F.R. § 314.92(a)(1) (2008).
77. Id.
78. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,872, 28,884 (July 10,
1989) (explaining that the purpose of 21 U.S.C § 355(j) "is to assure the marketing of generic drugs
that are as safe and effective as their brand-name counterparts").
79. See Division of Generic Drugs, FDA Policy and Procedure Guide 37 (1989); Abbreviated
New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 17,950, 17,961 (Apr. 28, 1992).
80. 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(ii).
81. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i).
82. 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iv).
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the labeling of the approved drug.83 In contrast to the brand-name manufacturer's
highly participatory role during the NDA approval process, the generic
manufacturer's involvement in the ANDA process is restricted to establishing the
extent of its identical nature to the branded counterpart. The scope of the FDA's
labeling review of an ANDA is confined solely to whether the generic drug's
labeling "is the same as the labeling approved for the [brand-name] drug." 84 In
fact, the FDA rejects ANDAs that contain new warnings or safety precautions
not present on the brand-name drug's label.85
2. Post-approval
Once the ANDA is approved, the generic manufacturer's labeling
responsibilities expand beyond merely demonstrating that its product's label is
identical to that of the listed drug. As noted earlier, FDA labeling regulations
reflect the reality that drug labels are subject to change.86 In some cases, it is only
after wide distribution and prolonged use that certain risks manifest. 87
Accordingly, after ANDA approval, FDA regulations charge generic
manufacturers, as well as brand-name manufacturers, with the obligation to
ensure that their products remain safe and effective as labeled.88 All
manufacturers must file annual reports that contain a "summary of significant
new information from the previous year that might affect the safety,
effectiveness, or labeling of the drug product" 89 and a "description of actions the
applicant has taken or intends to take as a result of this new information."90
All manufacturers have postmarket reporting duties. However, given the
different regulatory frameworks that govern brand-name and generic
manufacturers, their responsibilities are not the same. For example, the FDA does
not require generic manufacturers to conduct post-approval clinical studies as a
condition of ANDA approval, 91 nor do FDA regulations require generic
manufacturers to perform the same postmarketing surveillance, review, and data
collection activities as brand-name manufacturers.92 Such manufacturers are
required to review and analyze all reported adverse events.93 This analysis is
83. Id. § 314.94(a)(8)(iii).
84. 21 U.S.C. § 355()(2)(A)(v).
85. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,872, 28,884 (July 10,
1989).
86. Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 603 (8th Cir. 2011).
87. Id.
88. 21 U.S.C. § 355(k).
89. 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(2)(i).
90. Id.
91. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) ("The Secretary may not require that an abbreviated
application contain information in addition to that required by clauses (i) through (viii).").
92. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.81(b)(2)(i), 314.98 (2009).
93. Id. § 314.80.
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conducted based on the knowledge manufacturers obtain through the detailed
clinical trials that they conduct, in order to obtain FDA approval of their branded
drug. In contrast, generic manufacturers, who do not possess the underlying
scientific data, are required only to forward to the FDA adverse event reports. 94
In addition, the duty to notify the FDA about a change in safety information for
an approved drug differs depending on whether the manufacturer is an NDA or
an ANDA holder. Under current regulations, generic manufacturers "should"
notify the FDA about a change in safety information for an approved drug
application.95 Regulations governing brand-name manufacturers, however, state
that they "must" notify the FDA about a change in safety information.96
Similar to NDA holders, generic manufacturers are required to revise their
product labels to include a warning as soon as there is reasonable evidence of an
association of a serious hazard with a drug. 97 Failure to comply with these
regulations could render the drug "misbranded" and in violation of the FDCA.9 8
The regulatory mechanisms available for generic manufacturers to supplement
and make other changes to an approved ANDA are contained in 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.97.9 This section requires generic manufacturers to comply with 21 C.F.R.
§§ 314.70100 and 314.71,' which address "major changes" and "moderate
94. Id § 314.98(a) (requiring generic manufacturers to comply only with "the requirements of
§ 314.80 regarding the reporting and recordkeeping of adverse drug experiences," rather than the
review, scientific literature, and postmarketing provisions of § 314.80). Generic drug manufacturers
receive far fewer of the reports than their branded counterparts and the FDA. See FDA, CTR. FOR
DRUG EVALUATION & RES., OFFICE OF GENERIC DRUGS,, MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
(MAPP) 5240.8: HANDLING OF ADVERSE EXPERIENCE REPORTS AND OTHER GENERIC DRUG
POSTMARKETING REPORTS 1 (2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/
CentersOffices/CDER/ManualofPoliciesProcedures/ucm079791.pdf [hereinafter HANDLING OF
ADVERSE EXPERIENCE REPORTS AND OTHER GENERIC DRUG POSTMARKETING REPORTS]
(highlighting that the Office of Generic Drugs receives fewer adverse event reports, both because
the reports frequently do not identify a generic manufacturer for the drug and the safety profile of a
drug is well-known before the generic version is approved).
95. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 17,950, 17,961 (Apr. 28,
1992) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 2, 5, 10, 310, 314, 320, 433).
96. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(a) (2011).
97. See id § 201.57(c)(6)(i) (2006) (NDA drugs after June 30, 2001); id § 201.80(e) (NDA
drugs before June 30, 2001).
98. A drug is considered misbranded when its labeling is false, misleading, or does not provide
adequate instructions for use and adequate warnings. See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 321(n), 331(a)-(b), (k),
352 (a), (f), (j), (n) (2006).
99. 21 C.F.R. § 314.97 (2012) ("The applicant shall comply with the requirements of §§
314.70 and 314.71 regarding the submission of supplemental applications and other changes to an
approved abbreviated application.").
100. Id § 314.70. This section allows the manufacturer to supplement its application and
propose changes to the drug or its labeling through Prior Approval Supplement (PAS), see id.
§ 314.70(b), or through the CBE supplement, see id § 314.70(c). The applicability of these
provisions to generic manufacturers is discussed infra in Subsection 1.B.2.
101. Id § 314.71 (2008) (detailing the requirements for making changes to supplements). This
regulation states that the procedures are identical to those required for drugs submitted under 21
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a. Mechanisms for Postmarket Modifications: Prior Approval
Supplement
Major changes comprise a large portion of labeling modifications.'O2 The
procedure for effectuating a major change requires submission of a supplemental
application that must be approved by the FDA prior to modifying the label.' 03 For
generic manufacturers, however, this prior approval supplement only allows
generic manufacturers to use the Prior Approval Supplement (PAS) to revise
their product to mirror major changes that their branded counterparts
implement.'1 The overarching uniformity requirements contained in the
regulations prohibit a generic manufacturer from initiating independent labeling
changes. 105
Even if a generic manufacturer could propose a label change through the
PAS process, it is questionable if a generic manufacturer would be in a position
to evaluate the available data to determine whether or which types of labeling
changes are potentially needed. As noted previously, brand-name manufacturers'
reporting requirements necessitate collecting and analyzing all adverse event
information associated with their drugs.10 6 From that information and the
background knowledge acquired through the clinical trials and NDA approval
process, brand-name manufacturers have the ability to assess the reported
adverse events and discern the need for, and wording of, a major labeling
change. 0 7 The regulatory framework that governs generic manufacturers
recognizes that they lack the research base of brand-name manufacturers.
Consequently, generic manufacturers submit to the FDA only adverse event
reports they receive directly. 0 8 Given this limitation, the quality of their reports
C.F.R. § 314.50 (2008).
102. See generally Revisions to 21 CF. R. § 314.70: Supplement and Other Approved Changes
to an Approved Application: PhRMA Perspective, FDA Public Meeting, PHRMA, 6-10 (Feb. 7,
2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/DOCKETS/06nO525/06n-0525-
ts0009-LLucisano.pdf.
103. 21 U.S.C. § 356a(c)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(2)(v)(A).
104. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and
Biologics; Requirements for Prescription Drug Product Labels, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,082 (proposed Dec.
22, 2000).
105. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iii)-(iv); Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations,
57 Fed. Reg. 17,950, 17,960 (Apr. 28, 1992) ("After ANDA approval, FDA tracks the labeling
status of the pioneer drug product and, if necessary, notifies ANDA holders when and how they
must revise their labeling.").
106. 21 U.S.C. § 355(k); 21 C.F.R. § 314.80.
107. 21 C.F.R § 314.510 (discussing that post-approval requirements of the FDA typically
include conducting additional clinical trials to support new drug indications or formulations, and
satisfying safety and efficacy concerns that arise.); see also Clinical Trials Guidance, supra note
51, at 4.
108. 21 C.F.R. § 314.94.
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and any resulting major change request could be compromised by the lack of data
from clinical trials. FDA Deputy Commissioner Mark Novitch echoed this
concern when he stated, "[I]f adverse reaction reports were received by firms
unfamiliar with the clinical trials, and, because of the nature of their business,
lacking ties with the research community, we are concerned about the adequacy
of the reports we would receive."1 09
b. Mechanisms for Postmarket Modifications: Changes Being Effected
While major changes require prior FDA approval, moderate changes as
specified in 21 C.F.R. § 314.71 do not. Moderate changes to an approved label
include alterations to "add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution
or adverse reaction."" 0 Such changes are brought to the FDA's attention through
the CBE process."' The flashpoint in the preemption debate that PLIVA settled
was whether this process would be available to generic manufacturers. On one
side of the debate were those who argued that when the FDA adopted the
regulations implementing Hatch-Waxman, the FDA included a provision that
required generic manufacturers to "comply with the requirements of §§ 314.70
and 314.71 regarding the submission of supplemental applications and other
changes to an approved abbreviated application."" 2 Read in isolation, these
regulations appear to give generic manufacturers the ability to use the CBE
process unilaterally to make changes to their approved labels." 3 On the other side
of the debate were those, including the FDA and the Eighth Circuit, who
concluded that supplements and changes identified in 21 C.F.R. § 314.94 are
subject to the substantive standards governing ANDA "applicants," the person
submitting an original ANDA, an amendment, or a supplement and any person
who owns an approved ANDA.11 4 These pre-approval regulations specify that an
ANDA application will not be approved unless the generic drug's proposed
109. Reply Brief of Petitioners PLIVA, Inc., et al. on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7,
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (No. 09-993).
110. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(A).
1 11. Id.
112. 21 C.F.R. § 314.97; see, e.g., Stacel v. Teva Pharms., USA, 620 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D.
Ill. 2009); Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (W.D. Okla. 2009); Kellogg v. Wyeth,
612 F. Supp. 2d 421 (D. Vt. 2008).
113. See, e.g., Stacel, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 905 ("In other words, the regulations affecting
generic drug applications state explicitly that the CBE provisions apply to generic drug
manufacturers just as they do to name-brand manufacturers."); Bartlett v. Mutual Pharm. Co., 659
F. Supp. 2d 279, 296 (D.N.H. 2009) ("Just as nothing in the text of the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments forbids a generic manufacturer from changing its label from the listed version's post-
approval, nothing in the text of the CBE regulation forbids a generic manufacturer from using the
CBE process to do so.").
114. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 17-18,
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labeling is the "same as" that of the brand-name drug"' and that approval will be
withdrawn unless the generic labeling stays the "same as" its branded
counterpart." 6 Accordingly, under this interpretation, generic manufacturers
cannot use the CBE process to change unilaterally their products' labeling from
wording used by their branded counterparts. The centrality of the CBE process in
defining the post-approval responsibilities of generic manufacturers necessitates
a closer look at the FDA's position.
The FDA has long stressed that generic drugs' labels should be the same as
their branded counterpart.' In response to FDA-proposed regulations
implementing the labeling requirements of the Hatch-Waxman Act, several
comments addressed whether a generic manufacturer could include warnings or
precautions in addition to those listed on the branded drug."' The FDA
summarily rejected each suggestion.' 19 One comment, specifically addressing the
labeling requirements of 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8), proposed that labeling
provisions be "revised to permit ANDA applicants to deviate from the labeling
for the reference listed drug to add contraindications, warnings, precautions,
adverse reactions, and other safety-related information." 20 In rejecting the
suggested change, the FDA insisted that generic drugs labels "must be the same
as the listed drug product's labeling because the listed drug product is the basis
for ANDA approval."'21
Another comment suggested that the "FDA accept ANDAs with warnings or
precautions in addition to those on the reference listed drug's label, provided that
such information was not indicative of diminished safety or effectiveness of the
generic drug product." 2 2 Again, the FDA rejected the proposed change and
reiterated that Section 505(j)(3)(G) of Hatch-Waxman "requires the applicant's
115. 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iii); see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(g) (2006); 21 C.F.R. §
314.150(b)(I0) (providing that the FDA may withdraw approval of an ANDA for a generic drug if
it finds that the labeling for such a drug is "no longer consistent with that for the listed drug").
116. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(g); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.94(a)(8)(iii), 314.150(b)(10).
117. The FDA has reiterated this position several times in the 1992 Final Rule, 21 C.F.R. §§
314.94(a), 314.94(a)(8), 314.127(a)(7), and public comments to the 1992 final rule, see, e.g., 57
Fed. Reg. 17,961, cmt. 40 ("FDA disagrees with the comments [that] the labeling provisions should
be revised to permit ANDA applicants to deviate from labeling for the reference listed drug to add
contraindications, warnings, precautions, adverse reactions, and other safety-related information ...
[and that] ANDA applicants should be allowed to delete some of the indications contained in the
labeling for the reference listed drug . . . . Except for labeling differences due to exclusivity or a
patent and differences under section 505(j)(2)(v) of the act, the ANDA's product labeling must be
the same as the listed drug product's labeling because the listed drug is the basis for ANDA
approval.").
118. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 17,950, 17,961 (Apr. 28,




122. Id. at 17,953.
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proposed labeling be the same as that of the reference listed drug"1 23 and that "the
exceptions in section 505(j)(2)(A)(v) and (j)(3)(G) of the [Hatch-Waxman Act]
are limited."1 2 4 Similarly, the FDA disagreed with a suggestion that it accept
petitions under Section 355(j)(2)(C) to submit an ANDA for a product whose
labeling differs from its branded counterpart by being "more clear or offer[ing]
better directions regarding how the drugs should be taken."l 25 The FDA
admonished that "labeling differences, therefore, are not proper subjects for a
suitability petition"1 26 and "reminds applicants that the labeling for an ANDA
product must be the same as the labeling for the listed drug product except for
differences due to different manufacturers, exclusivity, etc." 1 27
Shortly after the adoption of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the FDA issued a
Policy and Procedure Guide. In the Guide, the FDA made it clear that, ultimately,
it controls the labeling of generic drugs. 12 8 The Guide reiterates that generic
manufacturers cannot unilaterally revise their product labels' warnings, but
instead must await FDA instructions before making any changes. 129 Part of the
FDA's rationale for this approach could be grounded in the recognition of the
fragmented nature of the market for generic drugs. There are multiple generic
competitors, each possessing only a portion of the accumulated safety data for a
given drug. As a result, the FDA reasoned that generic drug manufacturers
making unilateral changes could be both impractical and counterproductivel30
[E]ach time there is a change in the innovator's labeling, it could
necessitate similar changes in the labeling of as many as 20 or 30
generic products. A change in any section of the package insert
of the innovator's product, particularly an important change, e.g.,
in WARNINGS, PRECAUTIONS, CONTRAINDICATIONS
OR DOSAGE ADMINISTRATION, triggers action by the
Labeling Review Branch to request submission from all generic
manufacturers of that product. Prompt accomplishment of the
revision process is important to assure that consistency is found
in the labeling of all similar drug products."'
123. Id
124. Id
125. Id at 17,957.
126. Id.
127. Id
128. FDA, CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RES., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CHANGES TO AN
APPROVED NDA OR ANDA: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (1999).
129. FDA, CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RES., DIVISION OF GENERIC DRUGS, CHANGES IN THE
LABELING OF ANDAs SUBSEQUENT TO REVISION OF INNOVATOR LABELING, POLICY AND
PROCEDURES GUIDE No. 8-89 (1989) [hereinafter POLICY AND PROCEDURES GUIDE No. 8-89].
130. In general, generic manufacturers only possess data required by 21 C.F.R § 314.98
(ANDA post-approval requirements).
131. POLICY AND PROCEDURES GUIDE No. 8-89, supra note 129, at 1.
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By limiting the ability of brand-name manufacturers to implement changes
unilaterally, and by requiring generic product's labeling to be the same as its
listed drug, the FDA made clear the premium it places on uniformity (perhaps at
the expense of safety).132
In 2008, the FDA once again affirmed its position regarding the availability
of the CBE process for generic manufacturers and stated, specifically, that CBE
modifications are not available for generic drugs approved under an ANDA. To
the contrary, the proposed rule indicated that generic manufacturers' ability to
change a label unilaterally is confined to reflect "differences in expiration date
. . . or omission of an indication or other aspect of labeling protected by
patent." 33
To the extent that generic manufacturers may use the CBE mechanism to
propose or effectuate certain labeling changes, the FDA consistently has held that
such actions may be taken only to "conform" their product labeling to that of
their branded counterpart.' 34 In short, the FDA always has made clear that
generic manufacturers may not use the CBE process to craft their own warning
labels independently. 135
As discussed in the next Part, prior to PLIVA, the majority of courts
interpreted the regulatory framework as providing a sufficient basis to reject
generic manufacturers' preemption defense against state law failure-to-warn
claims. Accordingly, generic manufacturers were forced to choose between
compliance with FDA regulatory guidance or possible liability under state
failure-to-warn laws. With that specter of liability now removed, Part II examines
the FDA's position on generic manufacturers' labeling responsibilities as
articulated in PLIVA and the Supreme Court's incorporation of that position into
132. See supra Subsection 1.B.2; see also POLICY AND PROCEDURES GUIDE No. 8-89, supra
note 129, at 1.
133. 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8); see also Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57
Fed. Reg. 17,950, 17,953, 17,961 n.l (Apr. 28, 1992). The FDA issued its Final Rule on August 22,
2008. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Biologics, and
Medical Devices - Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603 (Aug. 22, 2008).
134. FDA, CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RES. (CDER), GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: REVISING
ANDA LABELING FOLLOWING REVISION OF THE RLD LABELING 5 (2000), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorynformation/Guidances/ucm
072891.pdf ("The sponsor of an ANDA is now responsible for ensuring that the labeling contained
in its application is the same as the currently approved labeling of the [branded drug].").
135. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. at 17,955 ("[T]he agency
wishes to remind ANDA applicants that . . . the labeling for an ANDA product must, with few
exceptions, correspond to that for the reference listed drug."); see also id. at 17,961 ("After ANDA
approval, FDA tracks the labeling status of the pioneer drug product and, if necessary, notifies
ANDA holders when and how they must revise their labeling."); CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION &
RES. (CDER), GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CHANGES TO AN APPROVED NDA OR ANDA 24 (2004),
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/
Guidances/ucm077097.pdf ("All labeling changes for ANDA drug products must be consistent
with section 505(j) the Act.").
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its holding. Next, this Part focuses on the implications of a framework that
immunizes generic manufacturers from failure-to-warn claims and exposes
consumers to potential harm from mislabeled medications.
II. THE FEDERAL PREEMPTION DEBATE'S EFFECT ON THE GENERIC-LABELING
FRAMEWORK
The preemption debate serves as a lens with which to examine the
inadequacies of the regulatory framework that prescribes generic manufacturers'
labeling responsibilities. While PLIVA recently has thrust the issue into the
limelight, consumers' tenuous ability to seek redress against generic
manufacturers long has rested on courts' varied interpretations of the FDA
regulations. Until Wyeth v. Levine, a majority of drug manufacturers had
successfully avoided failure-to-warn liability by arguing that the federal
regulatory framework preempted labeling changes prescribed by state law,
because it was impossible for manufacturers to comply with both.' In addition,
a number of courts had held that state law attempts to hold manufacturers liable
for failing to strengthen warning labels on their products posed an impermissible
obstacle to the effectiveness of federal regulations, and, thus, were preempted.137
In 2009, the Supreme Court's decision in Wyeth v. Levine extinguished these
defenses for brand-name manufacturers. Relying on the Supreme Court's
analysis, several circuits extended the Wyeth rationale to generic manufacturers
by holding that the existing regulatory labeling framework did, in fact, permit
generic manufacturers to comply with state law failure-to-warn laws. Two years
later in PLIVA v. Mensing, a consolidated appeal from the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits, the Supreme Court ruled on the soundness of their interpretation.
A. Generic Manufacturers'Regulatory Framework Before PLIVA v. Mensing:
Wyeth v. Levine and the Subsequent Circuit Split
The Supreme Court's decision in Wyeth called into question the viability of
generic manufacturers' preemption defense and set the stage for PLIVA. The
Wyeth decision, however, did not involve, or even reference, generic
manufacturers, the Hatch-Waxman Act, ANDAs, or specific labeling
136. See, e.g., Home v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 541 F. Supp. 2d 768 (W.D.N.C. 2008); see
also Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff'd, 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir.
2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009).
137. Mason v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625 (C.D. Ill. 2008); Dobbs
v. Wyeth Pharm., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1279-82, 1288-89 (W.D. Okla. 2008); In re Bextra, No.
M: 05-1699 CRB, 2006 WL 2374742, at *6-*9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006); Conte v. Wyeth, Inc.,
No. CGC-04-437382, 2006 WL 2692469, at *4-*6 (Cal. Super. Sept. 14, 2006); Gourdine v.
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regulations. 3 8 Nevertheless, it is impossible to discuss the adequacy and contours
of the labeling regulatory framework that governs generic manufacturers without
starting with Wyeth.
In 2001, Diane Levine sued Wyeth for injuries she suffered after receiving a
direct intravenous injection of Wyeth's nausea medication, Phenergan.139 Using a
procedure known as IV push, the drug was inadvertently injected into her artery
instead of her vein, resulting in gangrene and the eventual amputation of her
arm.140 Levine filed failure-to-warn claims against Wyeth, the manufacturer of
the product. She alleged that the FDA-approved label was inadequate because it
failed to warn healthcare professionals of the risk that an improper IV push could
cause injuries like those she suffered. 141 Wyeth maintained that Levine's failure-
to-warn claims were preempted by federal law because the FDA had approved
Phenergan for direct IV injection and had approved the labeling that warned of
its risks. 142
In March 2009, the Supreme Court held that Levine's failure-to-warn claims
were not preempted against brand-name manufacturers.143 The Court considered
and rejected Wyeth's preemption arguments that (1) it would have been
impossible for Wyeth to alter existing FDA-approved labeling to comply with the
state law in question without violating federal law ("impossibility preemption"),
and (2) Levine's state law failure-to-warn claims interfered with the
congressional objectives by substituting a lay jury's decision of the adequacy of a
drug's labeling for the expert judgment of the FDA ("obstacle preemption").'"
According to the Wyeth Court, the manufacturer, and not the FDA, bears
responsibility for the content of its label at all times. 145 The Court underscored
this point by noting that the FDA did not even ossess the authority to require a
drug manufacturer to alter its label until 2007. Despite key differences in the
regulatory frameworks that govern brand-name and generic drugs, courts
increasingly relied on Wyeth's reasoning to reinterpret the requirements of the
regulatory framework governing generic manufacturers.
For example, in Schrock v. Wyeth, 147 an Oklahoma district court interpreted
Wyeth v. Levine broadly, holding that "the United States Supreme Court has
clearly concluded that Congress did not intend [to] preempt state-law failure-to-
138. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).




143. Id. at 581. Justice Stevens wrote for the majority and was joined by Justices Kennedy,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Thomas concurred in judgment, but wrote a separate opinion.
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Alito dissented.
144. Id. at 569-71.
145. Id. at 570-71.
146. Id.
147. 601 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (W.D. Okla. 2009).
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warn actions." 1 48 In denying the generic manufacturer's motion to dismiss, the
court applied Wyeth without considering the regulatory differences between
brand-name and generic manufacturers. The Schrock court quoted Wyeth's
analysis of congressional intent regarding a drug manufacturer's responsibility to
maintain adequate drug labeling, stating, "With respect to a change in drug labels
based upon safety information which becomes available after a drug's initial
approval, Congress 'adopted a rule of construction to make it clear that
manufacturers remain responsible for updating their labels." 149 The court
reiterated Wyeth's analysis that unless a manufacturer makes a clear showing that
the FDA would reject a label change, making such a change is not impossible.15 0
In Stacel v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, an Illinois district court cited Wyeth
and its interpretation of the Code of Federal Regulations as the basis for denying
the generic manufacturer's preemption defense.i 5 ' Unlike Schrock, the Stacel
court acknowledged the regulatory differences between brand-name and generic
manufacturers. Nevertheless, after considering these differences and engaging in
its own analysis of regulations applicable to generic manufacturers, the court
concluded not only that the congressional objectives for generic drug labeling are
the same as those for brand-name drug labeling, but also that the CBE process is
available to both brand-name and generic manufacturers.152 The court further
reasoned that "if the generic manufacturers can utilize the CBE, then the logic of
Wyeth is directly applicable." 5 3 In considering the Wyeth Court's observation
that Congress utilizes state tort actions to help regulate brand-name drugs, the
court reasoned that Congress could not take a different position with respect to
generic drugs. 154 The court noted that, while generic drugs must have the same
labels as their branded counterparts during the application process, the Hatch-
Waxman Act does not require the labels to remain the same after approval. 55
Accordingly, the court concluded that, because labeling is a manufacturer's
responsibility and the statute does not require identical labeling post-approval,
state law consumer protection duties do not conflict with congressional
objectives. 156
Finally, in Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharmaceuticals Co., the Ninth Circuit relied in
part on Wyeth to elevate generic manufacturers' labeling responsibilities to that
of their branded counterparts and, thus, to reject the generic manufacturer's
148. Id at 1264.
149. Id
150. Id (citing Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 564).
151. 620 F. Supp. 2d 899, 905-07 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
152.1d. at 905.
153.Id
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preemption argument. The court justified its elevation of generic
manufacturers' responsibilities by referencing the Wyeth conclusion that,
"because manufacturers have 'superior access to information' about their drugs
than does the FDA, especially in the post-marketing phase as new risks emerge,
they 'bear primary responsibility for their drug labeling at all times.'" As
demonstrated by the legal analysis that formed PLIVA appeal, the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits similarly relied on Wyeth to reject generic drug manufacturers'
preemption defense.
B. PLIVA v. Mensing Proceedings Below
In 2001, Gladys Mensing's doctor prescribed her Reglan to treat her diabetic
gastroparesis, a paralysis that prevents the emptying of the stomach.159 A year
later, Julie Demahy's doctor prescribed her Reglan to treat her gastroesophageal
reflux disorder, a condition that prohibits contractions of the esophagus, stomach,
and intestines. 160 Pursuant to their states' generic substitution laws, Mensing's
and Demahy's pharmacists filled their prescriptions with generic versions of
Reglan.161 Mensing and Demahy took the drug as prescribed for approximately
four years.162 Subsequently, both women developed tardive dyskinesia, a severe
neurological disorder.163 In separate state court actions, Mensing and Demahy
sued the generic manufacturers, Wyeth, Inc. and Actavis, Inc. respectively, over
the medications.164 Both state law complaints alleged that "despite mounting
evidence that long term metoclopramide use carries a risk of tardive dyskinesia
far greater than indicated on the label," 65 the generic manufacturers took no
steps to meet their state law obligations to modify their labels to warn of the
risks.166 In response, the generic manufacturers in both cases argued that the
plaintiffs' state law tort claims were preempted by federal statutes and FDA
regulations.
In Mensing v. Wyeth, the federal district court in Minnesota granted the
generic drug manufacturer's motion to dismiss, holding that the Hatch-Waxman
Act preempted state law failure-to-warn claims.167 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit
157. Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharm. Co., 630 F.3d 1225, 1127 (9th Cir. 2011).
158. Id at 1230 (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 578 (2009)).
159. Brief for Respondents Gladys Mensing and Julie Demahy at 4, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,
131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, 09-1501), 2011 WL 686400, at *4.
160. Id.
161. Id. at *4-*5.
162. Id. at *5.
163. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2573.
164. Id.
165. Id at 2573 (quoting Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 2009)).
166. See, e.g., id.
167. Mensing, 588 F.3d at 605.
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reversed, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Wyeth v. Levine.168 The Eighth
Circuit acknowledged that "generic labels must be substantively identical to the
name brand label even after they enter the market." 69 Nevertheless, the Mensing
court rejected Wyeth's preemption defense by concluding that federal law would
have at least allowed them to propose "a label change that the FDA could receive
and impose uniformly on all metoclopramide manufacturers if approved."'1
70
The Eighth Circuit supported its holding by stating that 21 C.F.R § 201.57(e)
requires a generic manufacturer to "take steps to warn its customers when it
learns it may be marketing an unsafe drug."'71 The court disagreed with the
argument that generic manufacturers comply with the regulation simply by
172
ensuring that their labels are identical to their branded counterpart. In the
court's view, generic manufacturers are not "passively to accept the inadequacy
of their drug's label as they market and profit from it." 73
Building on its interpretation that the regulations prohibit generic
manufacturer passivity, the Eighth Circuit made short work of the generic
manufacturer's impossibility defense.174 Specifically, Wyeth argued that federal
regulations requiring generic manufacturers to maintain warning labels identical
to their branded counterparts prohibited these manufacturers from altering their
labels to comply with stronger state law requirements through use of the CBE
process. 175 In an interesting piece of legal draftsmanship, the court declined to
address Wyeth's CBE argument directly. Instead, the court returned to its "steps
could have been taken" refrain to render Wyeth's defense moot, stating, "In this
case we need not decide whether generic manufacturers may unilaterally enhance
a label warning through the CBE procedure because the generic defendants could
have at least proposed a label change that the FDA could receive and impose
uniformly on all metoclopramide manufacturers if approved."' 76 The court also
noted that the manufacturer "'may seek to add safety information to a drug label'
through the prior approval process or by requesting that the FDA send 'Dear
Health Care Professional' letters."1 77 The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that
"Congress did not intend that generic manufacturers send out 'Dear Healthcare
Provider' letters uncoordinated with other manufacturers of the drug."17 8
Nevertheless, the court maintained that the generic manufacturer "could have
suggested that the FDA send out [such] a warning letter to health care
168. Id at 607-08 (discussing Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009)).





174. Id. at 608.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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In refusing to decide definitively on the applicability of the CBE process, the
court appeared at least to entertain the notion that the regulatory framework does
not provide a mechanism for generic manufacturers to change their labels
unilaterally. Rather than concede impossibility, however, the Eighth Circuit
offered a solution, namely, that generic manufacturers always have the option of
not selling their product: "The generic defendants were not compelled to market
metoclopramide. If they realized their label was insufficient but did not believe
they could even propose a label change, they could have simply stopped selling
the product." 80
In Demahy v. Actavis, a federal district court in Louisiana similarly denied a
motion to dismiss filed by the generic manufacturer."' The Fifth Circuit
affirmed, holding that Demahy's state law claims were not preempted, based in
large part on its reliance on Wyeth. 182 Notwithstanding its broad reliance on
Wyeth, the court offered several novel regulatory interpretations that are worth
discussing.
In contrast to Mensing, where the Eight Circuit chose not to address directly
the applicability of the CBE process, in Demahy, the Fifth Circuit opted for a
different approach. After a detailed review of FDA statements and regulations,
the court determined that the statutory scheme was silent about the
manufacturer's obligations after the ANDA is granted. 83 From that silence, the
court deduced that the FDA does not expressly prohibit generic manufacturers
from using the CBE process.'8 As a result, the court stated, "[w]ithout explicit
reference to the use of the CBE process by generic manufacturers, we decline to
read in a bar to its use."' 85 The court applied this same "no specific prohibition"
logic to its conclusion with respect to the availability of Dear Doctor letters. 186
The court conceded that, while these letters require pre-approval by the FDA,
nothing in the regulations specifically prohibits generic manufacturers from at
least proposing that the FDA send them out on their behalf.'8 '
When presented with arguments that inherent deficiencies in the regulatory
framework made meeting both federal and state labeling requirements
impossible, the court was unmoved. In particular, under the current regulatory
scheme, if a generic manufacturer attempted to change its label, Actavis argued
that the FDA could withdraw approval for the drug upon finding "a lack of
179. Id at 611.
180. Id.
181. Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 430 (5th Cir. 2010).
182. See also id. at 430, 434-35, 446, 449 ("Levine is not the case before us.").
183. Id at 426, 436.
184. Id. at 442.
185. Id at 444.
186. Id. at 444-45.
187. Id. at 445.
233
HeinOnline  -- 12 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 233 2012
25
Lee: Generic Consumers' Unfortunate Hand
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented
to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in its
labeling."' 8 8 Actavis further asserted that changing the label makes it no longer
consistent with its branded counterpart and could also prompt the FDA to initiate
withdrawal of approval proceedings.'89 Again relying on Wyeth, the Fifth Circuit
responded it would be "difficult to accept" that the FDA would take punitive
action against a manufacturer for strengthening a warning.1 90 Instead, once
additional risks to the drug emerge, federal law does not preclude the generic
manufacturer from taking steps to change the label to provide adequate
warnings.' 9' According to the court, the regulatory framework allows a generic
manufacturer to comply with both FDA regulations and state law by updating its
labeling, proposing to update its labeling, or warning healthcare providers
directly.192
The Demahy court also asserted that the regulatory framework requires all
drug manufacturers to revise their products' labeling as soon "as there is
reasonable evidence of an association of a serious hazard with a drug."' 93 This
assertion mischaracterizes the regulatory framework. As a threshold matter, 21
C.F.R. § 201.80(e) does not require generic manufacturers to revise their labels
before their branded counterparts.194 As Wyeth recognized, that regulation
obligates the brand-name manufacturer "both with crafting an adequate label and
with ensuring that its warnings remain adequate as long as the drug is on the
market."9' The rationale for this requirement is the fact that brand-name
companies conduct the original clinical studies, form postmarket studies, and are
subject to extensive post-approval surveillance obligations.196 As such,
companies are able to place information they acquire in context, review it,
analyze its significance, and craft the suitable labeling change based on
"sufficient evidence" of the standards for which changes are met.'97 By contrast,
generic manufacturers lack the comprehensive data possessed by brand-name
manufacturers and lack the context to assess properly the limited post-approval
information they received. 198 In recognition of this, the FDA interprets 21 C.F.R.
188. Id. at 438.
189. Id
190. Id. at 439 (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 570 (2009)).
191. Id
192. Id. at 439, 444.
193. Id. at 437.
194. 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e).
195. Demahy, 593 F.3d at 437 (quoting Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 571 and citing 21 C.F.R. §§
201.80(e) and 314.80(b)).
196. 21 C.F.R § 314.80(b) (discussing postmarketing reporting obligations for NDA
applicants).
197. See Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs,
Biologics, and Medical Devices - Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603, 49,603-605 (Aug. 22, 2008).
198. See, e.g., id at 49,604 ("[T]he causal relationship between a product and an adverse
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§ 201.80(e) as requiring generic manufacturers to conform their labeling to that
of the brand-name manufacturer in a timely manner. Nevertheless, the Eighth
Circuit's regulatory interpretation allowed it to hold that Demahy's state law
failure-to-warn claims were not preempted. The generic manufacturers appealed.
The Supreme Court granted their petitions for certiorari and consolidated the
cases for review.199 The issue on appeal was whether the duties imposed on
generic manufacturers by federal regulations conflicted with, and therefore
preempted, the state law duties that would have required a different label.200
C. PLIVA v. Mensing
Similar to their arguments in the proceedings below, Mensing and Demahy
argued before the Supreme Court that the generic manufacturers could have, and
should have, used the CBE process to modify their labels unilaterally to warn
consumers of the true risks of the generic drug. They maintained that the CBE
process is an effective way for generic manufacturers "to bring evidence of the
need for a new warning to [the] FDA's attention and initiate consideration of
whether the labels for both the [brand-name] and generic drugs should be
changed."201 Under their interpretation of the regulations, if the FDA ultimately
were to approve the changes suggested by a generic manufacturer under the CBE
process, the FDA then would require that the same change take place on the
brand-name label.202 Accordingly, plaintiffs reasoned that a temporary departure
in the identical labeling between a generic and brand-name manufacturer
"reflects [the] FDA's determination that such temporary differences are justified
in the interest of drug safety."203 Plaintiffs further alleged that generic
manufacturers also could have sent a Dear Doctor letter warning healthcare
providers of the adverse risks associated with their product. 204
The Solicitor General's amicus brief provided a different interpretation. In
the FDA's view, federal regulations do not permit generic manufacturers to alter
their labels unilaterally, because of the overriding statutory and regulatory
requirements that generic drugs mirror the labels of their branded counterparts.
Accordingly, the federal labeling scheme for generic manufacturers precludes
effect is often difficult to establish and may require large trials, often specifically designed to assess
the risk."); see also Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 569 (noting that "risk information accumulates over time"
and that subsequent developments might have meaning only in light of "reports previously
submitted to FDA") (quoting 73 Fed. Reg. at 49,607).
199. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2573 (2011).
200. Id at 2572.
201. Brief for Respondents Gladys Mensing and Julie Demahy, supra note 159, at *34.
202. Id.
203. Id. at *35.
204. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2576.
205. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 114, at
*15.
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them from changing their labels, even under the CBE process.206 The Solicitor
General explained further that use of a Dear Doctor letter is similarly unavailable
to generic manufacturers.207 While the FDA conceded that no regulation
precludes generic manufacturers from sending these letters, it maintained that
such a letter "would only be appropriate in tandem with a corresponding change
to the [brand-name] drug's approved labeling." 208 Further, because a generic
manufacturer cannot take advantage of the CBE process, the appearance of new
risk information in a Dear Doctor letter would be contrary to FDA-approved
labeling.209
The majority deferred to the FDA's interpretations of the regulations
regarding the CBE and Dear Doctor processes. In a consummate application of
administrative deference, the Court concluded that the FDA's views were
"controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation[s]." 2 10
As a result, the Supreme Court chose not even to address the regulatory
interpretations offered by either of the parties. Consequently, the Court adopted
the FDA's argument that generic manufacturers are prohibited from unilaterally
changing their labeling under the CBE process, unilaterally issuing Dear Doctor
letters or using the PAS process. Interestingly, however, this is where the Court's
blanket deference to the FDA's regulatory interpretation ended.
The FDA maintained that, despite an inability to act unilaterally via the CBE
process or through a Dear Doctor letter, generic manufacturers had various
opportunities to inform the FDA about adverse reactions and risks caused by
their products and seek permission to revise their label.211 After notification from
the generic manufacturer of possible adverse health risks caused by the approved
drug, the Solicitor General asserted that the FDA could evaluate the risks, and, if
necessary, request that the brand-name manufacturer change its label or withdraw
the drug's approval.212 As support, the FDA referenced the final rule
implementing the ANDA process, which directs a generic manufacturer to
contact the FDA if it believes new safety information should be added to its
labeling.213 The FDA also noted that ANDA holders could contact the Office of
Generic Drugs (OGD) with concerns regarding their products. According to the
FDA, the OGD gives high priority to "ANDAs with possible serious safety
206. Id
207. Id at *18-*19 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(d)(1)).
208. Id. at *18.
209. Id. at *19 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(d)(1)).
210. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2575 (2011) (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519
U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).
211. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 114, at
*20-*35.
212. Id. at *21-*22 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(e); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.70, 314.150(a)(2)).
213. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 114, at
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concerns.',214 From this process, the FDA reasoned that generic manufacturers
were not powerless to set in motion a process that could lead to safety-enhancing
label changes or product removal, both of which could be consistent with state
law duties. The FDA maintained that, before a generic manufacturer could claim
the affirmative defense of preemption, it must show that (1) the manufacturer
proposed to the FDA a label change that could have prevented plaintiffs' injuries,
and, (2) the FDA would have denied any request for that label change.215
According to the Solicitor General, only after the manufacturers had asked the
FDA for a stronger warning when learning about the link between their product
and tardive diskensia, and the FDA had rejected a label change, could the
manufacturers claim that compliance with the state law duty to warn was truly
impossible.
The Supreme Court rejected this regulatory interpretation. In the Court's
view, preemption was proper because there were no steps that the generic
manufacturers could have taken independently to comply with both state and
federal requirements. In doing so, the Court shed light on why the FDA's no-
preemption position and the "steps could have taken" approach affirmed by the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits were unpersuasive. The majority pointed out that the
state law's duty is satisfied only by securing a safer label, not by communicating
with the FDA about the possibility of a safer label.216 The Court reasoned that
had the generic manufacturers alerted the FDA to the increased risk, rather than
satisfied their state tort law duties, they would have done no more than "started a
Mouse Trap game that eventually [could have led] to a better label on generic
metoclopramide."217 In the Court's view, the Mouse Trap game is not enough to
avoid preemption. Rather, the test to overcome preemption is "whether the
private party could independently do under federal law what state law requires of
it."218 Because "asking the FDA for help" in changing the label, and not
changing label on their own, was the only action generic manufacturers could
independently take, the Court concluded that plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claims
were preempted.2 19
D. Implications for Consumers, Healthcare Providers, and States
To understand the far-reaching effects that PLIVA could have on patient
health and safety requires an examination of the dominant role that generic drugs
play in today's healthcare industry. Since passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the
214. Id. at *21 (quoting CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND REs., MANUAL OF POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES 5200.6, at 3 (May 9, 2001)).




219. Id at 2580.
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impact of generic competition on overall drug prices has been dramatic.
Approximately seventy-five percent of all drugs prescribed in 2009 were
generic.220 As a result of concerted efforts by Congress, states, insurers, generic
drug companies, physicians, and pharmacists, generic drugs fill nearly 2.6 billion
prescriptions a year.22 1 The Congressional Budget Office reported that generic
drug use in 2007 saved senior citizens and the federal government thirty-three
billion dollars just on Medicare Part D prescriptions alone.222 Another recent
study reported that dispensing generic versions of brand-name drugs saved the
American healthcare system more than $824 billion over approximately the past
decade (2000-2009) and $139.6 billion in 2009 alone.223 Today, the average
generic drug costs barely a quarter of its branded counterpart.224 A 2009 IMS
National Prescription Audit illustrated this saving by comparing the typical
insurance or government formulary charges: $6 for generic medications; $29 for
preferred brand-name drugs; and $40 or more for non-preferred brand-name
drugs. 225 The natural effect of the affordability of generic drug alternatives is a
dramatic increase in their use.
Adding to the pervasive use of generics are state substitution laws. These
laws permit or require pharmacists who receive prescriptions for brand-name
drugs to fill them with the drugs' generic equivalent.226 In addition, even in those
states where pharmacists are only permitted (not required) to substitute generics
for brand-name drugs, consumers tend to opt for generics because insurance
companies often charge higher co-pays for a brand-name drug when a generic is
available.227 State policies favoring generic substitution also receive extra force
in the context of publicly funded programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, and the
220. Id. at 2884 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
221. Facts at a Glance, GENERIC PHARM. Ass'N (Mar. 10, 2012), http://www.gphaonline.org/
about-gpha/about-generics/facts (noting that, overall, only eight out of the fifty most popular drugs
are still brand names, compared to twenty in 2003).
222. CONGR. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS ON MEDICARE'S
PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING vii (2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/ftpdocs/1 1 8xx/docl 1838/09-15-prescriptiondrugs.pdf [hereinafter CBO 2010].
223. Press Release, Generic Medicines Saved U.S Health Care System $139.6 Billion in
2009; $824 Billion Saved Over the Last Decade, GENERIC PHARM. AsS'N, July 26, 2010,
http://www.gphaonline.org/medialpress-releases/2010/generic-medicines-saved-us-health-care-
system-1 396-billion-2009-824-billio.
224. CBO 2010, supra note 222, at 8-9.
225. Murray Aitken et al., Prescription Spending Trends in the United States: Looking Beyond
the Turning Point, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS w151, w151-60 (2009).
226. William H. Shrank et al., State Generic Substitution Laws Can Lower Drug Outlays
Under Medicaid, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1383, 1386 (2010).
227. Experts Brief, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039,
09-1501), 2011 WL 794111, at *19-*20 (citing Geoffrey F. Joyce et al., Employer Drug Benefit
Plans and Spending on Prescription Drugs, 288 JAMA 1733 (2002)); Haiden A. Huskamp et al.,
The Effective Incentive-based Formularies on Prescription-Drug Utilization and Spending, 349
NEw ENG. J. MED. 2224, 2225 (2003).
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State Children's Health Insurance Program.2 28 Many states require the
prescriptions for patients, whose drug expenses are covered by those programs,
to be filled with generic drugs.
In addition to state substitution laws, pharmacies have incentives to
substitute generic drugs when possible. The federal reimbursement rules in
industry pricing structures typically mean that pharmacies can earn a higher
markup on the generic option than the branded one.229 Insurers in the private
market may offer direct incentives to pharmacies to substitute cheaper generic
230drugs for the more expensive branded ones.
These features combine to help generic manufacturers earn above-average
profit margins. In 2007, profit margins for the top fifty industries in the United
States averaged 7.4% .231 Several of the top generic manufacturers saw profits of
12% to 25 0/--some of which even top the pharmaceutical industry's 15.8%
profit margin-without incurring the risk undertaken by brand-name
manufacturers in researching potential new drugs that may never come to
market.232 The above facts indicate that, as regulatory and institutional factors
have enabled them to obtain an increasing share of the prescription market,
generic manufacturers have enjoyed considerable growth in revenue and profits.
Going forward, a number of factors will further increase the growth of
generic drugs. The implementation of various provisions of the Affordable Care
Act (ACA) will increase Americans' access to care and prescriptions.
Specifically, the ACA provides significant expansion of coverage to the
uninsured through a Medicaid expansion, an individual requirement to obtain
health insurance, and subsidies to help low- and middle-income individuals buy
233
coverage through newly established Health Benefit Exchanges. Under the
terms of this Act, prescription drugs are one of the "essential health benefits" that
228. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 1396b(z)(2)(E); Office of Inspector General, Department of Health
and Human Services, Generic Drug Utilization and State Medicaid Programs, Jul. 2006, at i,
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-05-05-00360.pdf ("The Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (CMS) has encouraged generic drug substitution (i.e., substituting a generic
drug for its brand name equivalent) as a safe and effective way for states to increase drug utilization
and reduce costs.").
229. See S.P. Congressional Budget Office, Medicaid's Reimbursements to Pharmacies for
Prescription Drugs, at 4 (2004).
230. Helene L. Lipton et al., Pharmacy Benefit Management Companies: Dimensions of
Performance, 20 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 361, 370-96 (1999).
231. Top Industries: Most Profitable, CNNMONEY, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/
fortune500/2008/performers/industries/profits (last visited July 31, 2012).
232. See PLIVA, ANNUAL REPORT 2007, at 4 (2008); see TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES
LIMITED, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT; Ben Hirschler & Quentin Webb, Actavis Sees Record Year, No
Rush to Sell, Sept. 30, 2010; Wockhardt Unlimited, Annual Report 2009-10, at 73 (2010).
233. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501(b), 10106(b),
124 Stat. 119, 244-49, 909-10 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation
Act of2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, §§ 1002, 1004, 124 Stat. 1029, 1032-34 (2010) (to be codified at
26 U.S.C. § 5000A).
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must be included in health plans.234
Between now and 2014, the patents of seven of the world's twenty best-
selling drugs will expire. 235 The loss of patent protection for these blockbuster
drugs will invite competition from generic manufacturers. The ability of generic
drug manufacturers to capture significant portions of the market share after a
brand-name drug loses its patent is increasing. For example, between 1991 and
2361993, generic drugs represented 44% of a market after one year. By 2008,
generic drugs controlled as much as 86% to 97% of a market within the first
month of entry.237
It is against this backdrop that the Supreme Court held that generic
manufacturers are prohibited from unilaterally taking any steps to ensure the
safety and accuracy of their products' warning labels.2 38 The following are
barred: altering warning labels through the CBE process to reflect the most up-to-
date warnings; issuing additional warnings to healthcare providers through Dear
Doctor letters; and publicly disseminating any additional warnings on their
own.239 Further, the Court held that consumer state law failure-to-warn claims
based on these inadequately labeled products are preempted as a matter of law. 240
Of the possible harms that can result from PLIVA, the most serious is the
extent to which it jeopardizes the health of the growing number of consumers
taking generic drugs. As noted previously, once a brand-name manufacturer loses
patent protection, generics quickly capture large portions of the market.2 4 1 While
a generic drug's branded counterpart is still on the market, the regulatory
framework requires brand-name manufacturers to uncover safety risks. Brand-
name manufacturers, however, often leave the market once generic versions are
approved. According to IMS Health, a leading aggregator of prescription and
pharmaceutical sales, out of 4,318 unique drug molecules with active sales,
nearly one-third are available exclusively in generic form.242 In other words, the
only version of the prescribed drug is one that is subject to ANDA regulations.
234. Id.
235. MEDCO, Estimated Dates of Possible First Time Generic/Rx-to-OTC Market Entry (Jan.
2012), http://www.medcohealth.com/art/corporate/anticipatedfirsttimegenerics.pdf.
236. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, at 28 (Jul. 1998), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf
237. Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 1706
Before the H. Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection, of the Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, Illth Cong. 8 (2009) (statement of Diane E. Bieri, Exec. VP and Gen. Counsel,
Pharm. Res. & Mfrs. of Am.).
238. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
239. Id at 2575-76.
240. Id. at 2577-78.
241. Id. at 2584 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
242. GENERIC PHARM. ASS'N, SAVINGS ACHIEVED THROUGH THE USE OF GENERIC
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This highlights a common practice in the pharmaceutical industry. A brand-name
manufacturer monitors its product only for as long as it has a financial incentive
and legal obligation to do so. Once a manufacturer loses its exclusivity, it also
loses its revenue stream. 243 As a result, it is not unusual for the brand maker to
simply stop selling the drug when facing a dramatic reduction in profits. 244 In
these situations, there is no manufacturer with the legal responsibility or ability to
uncover inadequate label warnings-or even warn consumers and healthcare
providers.
Compounding this safety concern is the fact that many long-term risks do
not emerge until after a drug is sold as a generic. Often brand-name drugs are
approved after short-term safety studies and the long-term effects of a drug are
not known for years. Continual monitoring of possible side effects is critical to
ensure safety, even in drugs that have lost their patent protections. For example,
Metoclopramide, first marketed as Reglan, was approved by the FDA in 1980.245
The drug was available in generic form by the mid-1980s. 2 46 New risk
information about the safety of the drug emerged in 2004 and again in 2009.247
Both times, the information resulted in significant label changes. As PLIVA
makes clear, under the regulatory system, the FDA and brand-name
manufacturers are solely responsible for developing drugs, crafting labeling
changes, and communicating labeling revisions to healthcare providers and
consumers. 248 While the Court acknowledges that generic manufacturers have a
duty to monitor the ongoing safety of their products and ensure the adequacy of
their product labels, these duties are in large part passive.249 The Court sidesteps
the issue of holding that generic manufactures have an affirmative duty to take
steps to revise by alerting the FDA and providing information about product
risks.2 50 Further, patients have no recourse against generic manufacturers who fail
251to take these steps.
This absence of generic manufacturer oversight may reasonably diminish
consumer confidence in the safety and effectiveness of generic drugs. Since the
passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the resultant proliferation of generic
243. Cf Martin A. Ramey, Conte v. Wyeth: Caveat Innovator and the Case for Perpetual
Liability in Drug Labeling, 4 Prrr. J. ENVTL. PUB. HEALTH L. 73, 87 (2010) (noting that generics
quickly capture the majority of market share for drug).
244. Brief for Marc T. Law et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 18, PLIVA,
Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, 09-1501), 2011 WL 794111.
245. Id. at 15.
246. Id
247. Brief of the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 15-16, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, 09-
1501), 2011 WL 794118 [hereinafter AMA Brief].
248. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2574.
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drugs, Congress and the FDA have gone to great lengths to assure consumers that
generic drugs are "just as safe and effective" as brand-name drugs. 25 2 For many,
these assurances imply that brand-name and generic manufacturers are bound by
the same requirements to actively monitor and ensure the safety of their products
that are prescribed to consumers. Echoing an expectation reinforced through
products liability case law, many also might presume that, if there is a defect in a
product, then both generic and brand-name manufacturers have a responsibility
to correct the problem, or, at a minimum, to alert the public. Given these
assumptions, consumers may rightly balk at the divergent responsibilities and
liability rules to which they can hold manufacturers of seemingly identical
products.
In addressing this strange statutory result, the dissent in PLIVA contends
that, as a result of the Court's holding, a drug consumer's right to seek redress for
inadequate warnings turns solely on the "happenstance" of whether her
pharmacist fills her prescription with the brand-name or a generic. 2 53 The
incongruity of the current framework is made more absurd by the fact that "brand
name manufacturers may elect to manufacture and distribute a generic version of
their own brand name drug-as Wyeth has done with Reglan-once the brand
name drug loses patent protection." 254 In such a situation, injured consumers
using the same drug, manufactured by the same company, would be treated
differently under the law based solely on fortuity.
In defining the manufacturer's duties in PLIVA, the Court established a
hierarchical distinction between brand-name and generic drugs. By mandating
substantially stricter safety monitoring requirements for brand-name drugs than
generic drugs, the Court undercut the congressional goal of promoting generics
as brand-name equivalents. PLIVA further deepened this divide by creating a
system where consumers of brand-name drugs can sue manufacturers for
inadequate warnings, but consumers of generic drugs cannot. This divergent
treatment results in two separate, but equally significant, categories of harm.
First, it robs individual plaintiffs of their right to be compensated for harm
incurred. Second, it eliminates legal incentives for generic drug manufacturers to
strive for safety, because they no longer have to worry about state failure-to-warn
claims.
Foreclosing consumer state failure-to-warn claims creates a schism in the
complementary federal and state regulatory schemes. The contributions of tort
law to product safety are well recognized. As the Supreme Court noted in Wyeth,
"[s]tate tort suits uncover unknown drug hazards and provide incentives for drug
252. Facts About Generic Drugs, FDA (Jul. 1, 2012, 11:31 PM), http://www.fda.gov/drugs/
resourcesforyou/consumers/buyingusingmedicinesafely/understandinggenericdrugs/ucm 167991 .ht
m.
253. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2592 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
254. Kellogg v. Wyeth, 612 F. Supp. 2d 437, 441 (D. Vt. 2009).
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manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly."25 5 In this regard, courts have
relied on state law as an important "layer of consumer protection that
complements FDA regulation. 2 56 PLIVA eviscerates that traditional state law
incentive for generic manufacturers in terms of monitoring and disclosing safety
risks. Failure to hold generic manufacturers accountable for nondisclosure of
known risks associated with their products also could create a schism between
branded and generic drugs that likely would be exploited in marketing
campaigns, and, ultimately, result in a turning away from generics by physicians
and consumers.
Generic manufacturers need to be incentivized beyond the federal regulatory
system to report known safety risks of their products. State tort suits aid in
protecting consumers when harmful consequences become evident in drugs
already approved by the FDA.257 When such information becomes apparent,
manufacturers may not take appropriate action. The practical reality is that
manufacturers often continue to sell their products for many years, while denying
serious safety risks or downplaying emerging safety concerns. 25 8 The potential
damage awards from state failure-to-warn litigation provides drug manufacturers
with incentives to quickly provide full and clear information to physicians and
the FDA that otherwise may not come to light. Without such a mechanism,
generic manufacturers may be motivated to act merely in their immediate
financial interest, and, subsequently, become less forthcoming in providing
safety-related data.
Litigation brought by individual patients helps to uncover previously
unavailable data on adverse effects, questionable practices by manufacturers, and
flaws in a regulatory system.259 PLIVA has the potential to dramatically reduce
the awareness of both the FDA and manufacturers of adverse consumer reactions
to generic and brand-name medications. In some cases, it is only when
consumers file failure-to-warn lawsuits that the harmful effects of drugs are
revealed. In fact, the Supreme Court noted that a benefit of the state law
regulatory scheme was that it "motivates injured persons to come forward with
255. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 579 (2009).
256. Id. For example, the Medicaid program provides medical assistance to persons who
cannot afford to pay their own medical costs and is funded in significant part by the states. Under
the program's third party liability provisions, states can recoup Medicaid payments from the
medical costs portions of tort judgments and settlements. Arkansas Dept. of Health & Human
Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006).
257. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 579.
258. Bruce M. Psaty & Richard A. Konmal, Reporting Mortality Findings in Trials of
Rofecoxib for Alzheimer Disease or Cognitive Impairment: A Case Study Based on Documents
from Rofecoxib Litigation, 299 JAMA 1813, 1813-17 (2008); Bruce M. Psaty et al., Potential for
Conflict of Interest in the Evaluation of Suspected Adverse Drug Reactions: Use of Cerivastatin
and Risk ofRhabdomyolysis, 292 JAMA 2622, 2626-30 (2004).
259. See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, The Role of Litigation in Defining Drug Risks,
297 JAMA 308, 308-11 (2007).
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information."260 By preempting future state law failure-to-warn claims, the
Supreme Court virtually eliminated this valuable conduit of information.
The current regulatory framework also could have far reaching implications
for states. The PLIVA Court's holding has, in effect, made the states financially
responsible for injuries caused by the negligence of a class of for-profit
corporations. By immunizing manufacturers from costs that their negligence
imposes on the healthcare system, injuries to consumers will go uncompensated
261 oftecs
by the wrongdoer. Many of the costs of providing medical care, rehabilitation,
and family support services will now be borne by state-funded programs.262 In
addition, states no longer can recoup Medicaid payments from the medical costs
portion of tort judgments and settlements through Medicaid's third party liability
provisions.263 This may lead some state legislatures to rethink their support for
generic drugs through state substitution laws. Moreover, providing immunity for
generic manufacturers seems at odds with a state's roles as both principal
protector of its citizens' health, safety, and welfare264 and regulator of its health
professionals.2 65
Finally, the Court's opinion could also adversely affect physician drug-
prescribing behavior. As noted by the American Medical Association (AMA),
26
physicians consider many factors in making healthcare decisions.266 Without
question, their first priority is patient safety. Nevertheless, in the current
healthcare environment, physicians are also under continual pressure to control
costs. As such, physicians should be able to prescribe an "equivalent" generic
drug with assurance that it is truly the same as the brand-name drug, not only on
the date of its approval, but during its lifetime on the market.267 In fact, the AMA
recognizes the benefits of generic drugs and supports the right of physicians to
prescribe generic equivalents. 2 68 To determine the optimal drug to prescribe,
frequently physicians rely on a benefit-risk profile. 269 These profiles encompass
the most current product safety information from brand-name manufacturers
under comprehensive regulatory requirements, not uncertain or unreliable safety
data. Divergent labeling responsibilities and liability rules for brand-name and
generic manufacturers, however, may now influence that assessment. 27 0 When a
260. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 579.
261. Brief for Nat'l Conf. of State Legislatures as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at
18, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, 09-1501), 2011 WL
794119.
262. Id.
263. Arkansas Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 280-92 (2006).
264. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 532 (1949).
265. Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 470 (1954).
266. See AMA Brief supra note 247, at 28.
267. Id
268. See id. at 29.
269. Id at 5, 21.
270. Id at 29.
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physician specifies a prescription to be filled with the brand-name drug, he or she
has an assurance that the drug company is monitoring the safety of that drug. In
contrast, if the generic drug is prescribed, there can be no guarantee that the
product safety information accompanying the generic drug is current or reliable.
As noted by Justice Sotomayor, this poses an ethical dilemma for prescribing
physicians and may cause them to question the substitution of a generic for a
brand-name drug.271
III. THE NEED FOR A NEW FRAMEWORK
A. Inadequacies of the Current Framework
1. Generic Manufacturers'Lack ofData
To market a brand-name drug, the current regulatory framework requires
manufacturers to conduct the original clinical studies, perform postmarketing
272
studies, and adhere to extensive post-approval surveillance requirements.
Complying with these duties affords the brand-name manufacturer access to
(1) virtually all clinical data on the branded and the generic versions of the drug,
(2) all world literature regarding the product, and (3) years of adverse reports
from all sources since the drug's approval.273
By design, the FDA deters generic manufacturers' access to comprehensive
data that are readily available to brand-name manufacturers.274 This exclusion
begins during the initial ANDA submission to the FDA and persists throughout
275the post-surveillance requirements.27 In establishing bioequivalence as part of
the ANDA process, generic manufacturers cannot access directly any information
contained in the brand-name manufacturers' NDA, including clinical data.
Rather, generic manufacturers are forced to rely on publicly available literature
and the FDA's prior findings of safety and effectiveness of an approved
-276medication.
271. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2593 (2011).
272. See supra Part I for a discussion of the brand-name drug approval process.
273. Id.
274. See pre- and post-approval processes discussed supra Section I.B.
275. Jane A. Fisher, Disclosure of Safety and Effectiveness Data Under the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 41 FOOD, DRUG COSM. L.J. 268, 270 (1986) (setting
down the historical basis of FDA's interpretation and implementation of the trade secrets doctrine
to data).
276. Some innovator manufacturers have filed citizen petitions against the use of the FDA's
prior findings. These findings often are based on data from studies submitted as part of an approved
NDA. While published literature is available in the public domain, data from NDA submissions
remain proprietary. Although the statutory language clearly allows for full NDA applications that
rely on data to which the applicant does not have right of reference, language does not clearly
specify whether this information can extend beyond published literature. Some pharmaceutical
manufacturers have argued that the intent of Section 505(b)(2) was to allow referencing only of
245
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Before a manufacturer submits an NDA for FDA approval, the FDA's
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research offers a consulting program to foster
early communications between the manufacturer and the FDA. Through this
program, brand-name manufacturers receive guidance on the data necessary for
submission as well as the regulatory requirements for demonstrating safety and
efficacy.277 During the NDA review, the brand-name manufacturer and FDA
work together on the drug's warnings and package insert. By the time the drug is
ready for marketing, its labeling reflects both the joint efforts of the FDA's years
of experience reviewing drugs and drafting warnings and the brand-name
278
manufacturers' firsthand knowledge of the clinical trial results.
Once introduced into the market, the FDA cannot implement subsequent
labeling revisions without first negotiating these changes with the drug brand
manufacturer. 27 9 Generic manufacturers are not included in these negotiations.
Data and knowledge exchanged here are beyond the reach of the generic
manufacturer. In fact, the FDA notifies the generic manufacturer of its proposed
changes only if the brand-name manufacturer is no longer marketing the
product. 2 80 Similarly, generic manufacturers cannot access the results of phase IV
clinical trials that brand-name manufacturers conduct at the FDA's request. 28 1
Perhaps it is in light of this systematized restriction from data that the FDA
limited the responsibility of generic manufacturers to ensuring that their products
were the same as those of the branded counterparts. This rationale for the FDA's
approach gains even more traction when one examines the quality of the
information that the generic manufacturer receives.
As noted previously, the FDA keeps current on postmarket surveillance by
requiring both generic and brand-name manufacturers to submit adverse events.
The generic manufacturer's responsibility is limited to submitting only those
adverse events that it receives directly. 282 While, theoretically, this would appear
to give generic manufacturers a knowledge base to suggest labeling changes, in
reality, it does not. As observed by the FDA, generic manufacturers rarely
receive adverse reports, since most are submitted to the brand-name
manufacturer or the FDA directly.283 In fact, adverse reports often fail to specify
portions of an NDA application available in the published literature, not proprietary portions of
data. The FDA has upheld its position that Section 505(b)(2) permits reliance on previous FDA
findings of safety and efficacy.
277. See Colacicco Amicus, supra note 30, at 4-5.
278. Id.
279. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, tit. IX §
901(a), 121 Stat. 823 (2007) (codified as amended in sections of21 U.S.C.).
280. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(o), 255-1(g), 333(f).
28 1. Id.
282. 21 C.F.R. § 314.98.
283. HANDLING OF ADVERSE EXPERIENCE REPORTS AND OTHER GENERIC DRUG
POSTMARKETING REPORTS, supra note 94 ("Generally, OGD [FDA's Office of Generic Drugs]
receives few [adverse event reports] or similar reports since the reports may not specify a generic
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generic manufacturers of the products entirely.28 4  While brand-name
manufacturers are required to submit all adverse reports to the FDA, they are not
required to share such information with the generic manufacturers of their
product.285 It is ultimately up to the FDA to determine what and how information
will be displayed to the public. 28 6
To this end, the FDA requests that manufacturers not submit adverse reports
unless there is (1) an identifiable patient and reporter, (2) a suspect drug, and
(3) an adverse event or fatal outcome. 2 87 The FDA is of the opinion that "reports
without such information make interpretation of their significance difficult, at
best, and impossible, in most instances." 288 It even has gone so far as to
encourage "manufacturers to submit requests to the Agency . . . to waive the
requirement to submit [forms] to the FDA for each adverse experience that is
determined to be both nonserious and labeled.",289 Given these constraints and the
current data vacuum in which generic manufacturers operate, it is hard to premise
wholesale labeling revisions based on one or two adverse reports, generated years
after approval.290
Another complication of the regulatory scheme is that once brand-name
manufacturers remove their products from the market in favor of generics, there
is typically no listing for either the brand-name drug or its generic equivalents in
the Physician's Desk Reference on prescription drugs. Without such listings and
with the generic manufacturers' inability to communicate independently with the
physicians, it seems almost impossible for physicians to communicate up-to-date
information regarding adverse affects to the manufacturer.
In 2007, Congress passed the Food and Drug Administration Amendments
Act, which strengthened the FDA's authority to compel labeling changes and
identify postmarket risks.29' Specifically, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) authorizes the
manufacturer for the drug product.").
284. Id
285.21 C.F.R. § 314.80(b).
286. See FDA, Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting Regulations Working Group, Center for
Drug Evaluation & Research, Guidance for Industry, Post-marketing Adverse Experience
Reporting for Human Drug and Licensed Biological Products: Clarification of What to Report 1-2
(1997), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory
Information/Guidances/ucmO71981.pdf.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 3.
289. Id at 4.
290. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Biologics,
and Medical Devices - Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603, 49,604 (Aug. 22, 2008) ("[T]he causal
relationship between a product and an adverse effect is often difficult to establish and may require
large trials, often specifically designed to assess the risk."); id. at 49,607 (noting that risk
information accumulates and reasoning that subsequent developments may only be relevant in light
of "reports previously submitted to FDA").
291. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat.
823 (2007) (codified as amended in sections of21 U.S.C.).
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FDA to require manufacturers to make certain labeling changes. Yet, as
illustrated by the FDA in the PLIVA facts, some generic manufacturers are
excluded from receiving FDA warning revisions.29 2 Specifically, the FDA did not
send letters to all metoclopramide manufacturers. Only brand-name and generic
manufacturers, with product labels identical to that of the brand-name product
that was on the market, were contacted.293
The data vacuum that the framework creates has taken on added significance
for consumers in the post-PLIVA world. The FDA maintains, and the Supreme
Court assumes, without deciding, that federal law requires generic manufacturers
to propose stronger labels.294 The regulatory framework, however, does little to
facilitate carrying out such a duty. As discussed in more detail in the following
Section, generic manufacturers' access to meaningful data, upon which they
could make such recommendations, is severely curtailed. For example, in the
PLIVA facts, the only information available to the generic manufacturer that
might have motivated the manufacturers to approach the FDA for a
recommended change was restricted to a handful of adverse reports and publicly
available information. In contrast, the FDA and the brand-name manufacturer
could rely on the original clinical data, all the world literature regarding the drug,
and twenty-nine years of data from adverse reports submitted by all brand-name
and generic manufacturers of the drug since it was approved. The harm in such a
framework is twofold. First, it essentially requires a generic manufacturer to
carry out its duty to monitor the safety of its drugs with one hand tied behind its
back. Second, thanks to PLIVA, it requires consumers to rely on a regulatory
framework that immunizes generic manufacturers against state law claims that
would flow from their failure to carry out their duty to continually monitor their
products' safety and propose stronger labels to the FDA. To support a warning
label revision, a generic manufacturer needs to demonstrate a change in the
product's risk-benefit analysis. This type of substantiation necessitates that a
generic manufacturer either produce or have access to clinical trial data. The time
and expense necessary to generate such data effectively deprive the Hatch-
Waxman Act's overriding purpose of providing American consumers and state
and federal governments with low-cost generic drugs. Consequently, regulatory
changes are needed to ensure that other options are available.2 95
292. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2006).
293. Brief of Petitioners Actavis Inc. and Actavis Elizabeth LLC, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,
131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, 09-1501), 2011 WL 288895, at *10.
294. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2576.
295. Drug Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1554 and H.R. 3605 Before the Subcomm. on Health
and the Env't of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. (1983) [hereinafter Hearings
on H.R. 1554 and H.R. 3605].
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2. Lack of Appropriate Mechanisms for Generic Manufacturers To Change a
Drug's Label
In PLIVA, the Supreme Court departed from its deference to all of the FDA's
ultimate conclusions over the issue of impossibility. As previously noted, the
FDA claimed that generic manufacturers had several mechanisms available to
them to advise the FDA about products' risks and adverse events. In describing
how generic manufacturers should meet their duty to provide adequate warnings,
the FDA referenced the preamble to the final rule implementing the ANDA
application process 296:
If an ANDA applicant believes new safety information should be
added to a product's labeling, it should contact FDA, and FDA
will determine whether the labeling for the generic and listed
drugs should be revised. After approval of an ANDA, if an
ANDA holder believes that new safety information should be
added, it should provide adequate supporting information to
FDA, and FDA will determine whether the labeling for the
generic and listed drugs should be revised.2 97
In the twenty-three years since implementing the ANDA process, the FDA has
failed to promulgate any regulations to govern this procedure. 2 98 Should a generic
manufacturer want to raise a safety issue, it is forced to flounder about in an ill-
defined process of contacting various members within the FDA's OGD. The
FDA provides no timeline for review, contact names for follow-up, specifications
of what a concerned manufacturer should submit, or description regarding what
happens after the proposed change is submitted. The only vague reference about
which type of investigation the FDA conducts after receipt is that "some labeling
reviews" will require the OGD to consult with various FDA components before
any change can be made.299 To date, the FDA has not identified which labeling
reviews trigger this type of consultation, nor has it identified the other
components within the FDA that participate in examining these requests. The
FDA justifies this haphazard approach by stating that such instances arise
infrequently.30 The Supreme Court found this "solution" insufficient for
preemption purposes. This Article draws an additional conclusion from the
absence of procedures to improve drug labeling.
The need for regulatory reform to ensure that generic drugs are properly
296. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 17,950, 17,961 (Apr. 28,
1992).
297. Id.
298. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 114, at
16.
299. Id. at 21.
300. Id
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labeled is evidenced by the inadequate FDA procedures that remain when a
brand-name manufacturer withdraws its product from the market. While the FDA
designates one of the remaining generic companies to serve as the new reference
drug, the generic manufacturer is still prohibited from using the CBE process to
change the label. Arguably, ensuring consumer confidence and avoiding
confusion requires brand-name and generic drug warning labels to be identical
when both drugs remain on the market. Perhaps it even justifies limiting a
generic manufacturer's postmarketing labeling duty to that of merely mirroring
its branded counterpart. This argument, however, ceases to be sound once the
brand-name drug exits that market. Nevertheless, the FDA, not the generic
manufacturer, is responsible for updating the product warnings. If the FDA
determines that labeling for the product should be revised to meet current
standards, it will advise the generic manufacturers to submit such labeling. 30 1
This seems to defy logic. As Congress has noted, "Clearly, the resources of the
drug industry to collect and analyze postmarket safety data vastly exceed the
resources of the FDA, and no matter what we do, they will always have vastly
greater resources to monitor the safety of their products than the FDA does." 302
Given this reality, the duty and ability to provide adequate warning labels should
reside with the generic manufacturer.
3. The FDA's Constraints Prevent Adequate Postmarket Monitoring
of Generic Drugs To Ensure Consumer Safety
By immunizing generic manufacturers and essentially removing the crucial
role the tort system has played in uncovering critical safety information, the
courts have placed total reliance on brand-name manufacturers and the FDA to
protect the public against pharmaceutical risks. At present, the FDA regulates
products constituting twenty-five percent of the U.S. GDP.303 The FDA approves
several hundred new and generic drugs each year, and it analyzes hundreds
more.304 Over the past six years, the number of ANDAs submitted to the FDA
has more than doubled. During the same period, staffing levels have only
increased by twenty percent.305 What is more, after the drug is approved, the
FDA's responsibility for monitoring drug safety increases. The FDA received
301. Determination That Brethine (Terbutaline Sulfate) Injection Was Not Withdrawn From
Sale for Reasons of Safety or Effectiveness, 72 Fed. Reg. 39,629, 39,630 (July 19, 2007).
302. 153 CONG. REC. S 11832 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2007) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
303. Bruce M. Psaty & R. Alta Charo, FDA Responds to Institute of Medicine Drug Safety
Recommendations - In Part, 297 JAMA 1917, 1917-19 (2007).
304. FDA, FY 2010 PERFORMANCE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS FOR THE
PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE ACT at 103 (2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/UserFeeReports/PerformanceReports/PDUFA/UCM24
3358.pdf.
305. Id. at 6, 82, 92.
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over 524,000 adverse event reports in 2010.306 As reflected in three recent
analyses of drug safety oversight, under these constraints, the FDA simply does
not have sufficient resources for responding promptly to safety problems that are
discovered after marketing approval.307 It also lacks adequate procedures for
quickly and effectively communicating appropriate risk information to the
public.308
Moreover, the FDA does not have the necessary competencies to interpret
the data it receives. Its own Science Board found that the FDA lacks sufficient
expertise in quantitative methods, such as statistics and biomathematics, to assess
the products it regulates or to guide sponsors to design valid and informative
studies. 309 The GAO recently has placed the FDA's drug safety program on its
watch list of high-risk areas requiring attention by Congress and the executive
branch:
Although improvements have been made, long-standing
concerns remain regarding the effectiveness of the FDA's post-
market oversight. FDA staff have expressed concern about their
ability to meet the growing postmarket workload, with some
maintaining that their premarket responsibilities are considered a
higher priority. FDA is also encountering technological and
staffmg issues that limit its capacity to conduct drug safety
studies.31 o
These deficiencies reflect an agency that is ill equipped to fulfill its vital role
in protecting the public from harm caused by inaccurately or inadequately
labeled generic drugs. Ensuring the public's safety necessitates the addition of
two critical components: (1) a regulatory framework that provides generic
manufacturers with the tools necessary to fulfill the Supreme Court's charge that
manufacturers bear responsibility for the labeling of their product at all times,
and (2) a framework that can work in conjunction with state tort systems to
306. AERS Patient Outcomes by Year, FDA, (July 1, 2012, 4:28 P.M.), http://www.fda.gov/
drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/surveillance/adversedrugeffects/ucm070461.htm
(reporting 471,291 "serious outcomes" and 82,724 reports of death).
307. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-i 1-278, HIGH-RISK SERIES: AN UPDATE 116-
17 (Feb. 2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl1278.pdf [hereinafter HIGH-RISK
SERIES: AN UPDATE]; U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-68, DRUG SAFETY: FDA HAS
BEGUN EFFORTS To ENHANCE POSTMARKET SAFETY, BUT ADDITIONAL ACTIONS ARE NEEDED 34
n.75 (Nov. 2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/298135.pdf; U.S. GOv'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-402, DRUG SAFETY: IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN FDA's
POSTMARKET DECISION-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT PROCESS 18 (Mar. 2006), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06402.pdf.
308. See INST. MED. NAT'L ACAD., supra note 38.
309. FDA, SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK: REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY 31-35 (Nov. 2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/07/briefing/
2007-4329b 02 01_FDA%20Report%20on%20Science%20and%20Technology.pdf.
310. HIGH-RISK SERIES: AN UPDATE, supra note 307, at 116-17.
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incentivize generic manufacturers to monitor their products and disclose adverse
drug effects through the risk of adverse verdicts and the cost of resulting damage
awards.
B. The New Framework
1. Necessary Tools for Generic Manufacturers
The framework providing generic manufacturers with the ability to label
their products adequately requires access to all relevant data and the
unambiguous authority to transform that information into adequate warnings.
While the issue in PLIVA focused on the availability of post-approval
mechanisms, a broader scope is needed. This Article suggests a framework that
seeks to remedy the unfortunate hand that generic drug consumers were dealt in
PLIVA, while preserving the Hatch-Waxman Act's policy objectives of "getting
safe and effective generics quickly to the market" without sacrificing the Act's
cost-saving aims.
For generic manufacturers to possess the necessary data to make meaningful
labeling suggestions, they need complete access to the clinical, animal, and
bioequivalence data submitted in the brand-name manufacturer's NDA.312 The
implementing language of the Hatch-Waxman Act allows generic manufacturers
to use brand-name drugs still under patent to obtain bioequivalence data.313
Hatch-Waxman also allows generic manufacturers to use FDA safety and
effectiveness findings, and publicly available literature, to reverse engineer the
components of the referenced drug. 314 When it approves a generic equivalent
developed through these indirect methods, the FDA does not render final
judgment that the drug is safe. Rather, the FDA is merely concluding that the
generic drug does not differ significantly in the rate of absorption when
administered in the same dose as its branded counterpart. 315 Giving generic
manufacturers access to the actual clinical results submitted in NDAs provides
them a more complete clinical base with which to evaluate the current and future
performance of their product.
This Article proposes another fundamental shift in the current framework in
terms of generic manufacturers' post-approval responsibilities and access to data.
All manufacturers bear the responsibility for the adequacy of their labeling. To
311. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 9 (1984).
312. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006) (describing the components necessary to constitute
bioequivalency for ANDA approval).
313. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).
314. 21 C.F.R. § 314(g)(ii) (2011). FDA's safety and effectiveness findings are contained in
the "Summary Basis of Approval" that the Agency prepares and makes publicly available. This
document is prepared in compliance with the safeguards against public disclosure of proprietary
and confidential information contained in 21 C.F.R. § 210.
315. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(B).
252
XII:2 (2012)
HeinOnline  -- 12 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 252 2012
44
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 12 [2012], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol12/iss2/1
GENERIC DRUGS
this end, crafting adequate warning labels necessitates that generic
manufacturers' possessing "superior" access to information about their drugs.316
As noted by the Supreme Court, this need is particularly important in the post-
marketing phase. As new risks emerge, compliance with FDA post-approval
reporting requirements should provide generic manufacturers with sufficient data
to discern the need for adequate labeling improvements. Currently, they do not.
To close that gap, generic manufacturer post-approval labeling regulations should
be the same as the regulations for brand-name manufacturers. Accordingly, the
proposed framework requires generic manufacturers to have access to and
analyze: (1) post-approval safety activities, (2) reports to worldwide regulators,
(3) safety-focused epidemiologic activities, (4) activities required for safety-
related labeling changes, (5) literature review for adverse-event information, and
(6) safety information provided to healthcare professionals. 317
A primary reason for the low cost of generic drugs is that the FDA does not
require generic manufacturers to replicate costly clinical trials for approval. 318
The proposed framework does not suggest altering this core cost-saving tenet.
Currently, brand-name manufacturers conduct and pay for the majority of post-
approval safety analyses.319 As with data generated in the NDA process, generic
manufacturers should have access to those data. Post-approval studies could
continue to be conducted by the brand-name manufacturer or through a
contracted laboratory.320 Regardless of how they are performed, the results
would be distributed to all manufacturers of the product. A critical distinction
between generic manufacturers' access to NDA information and access to the
post-approval information is that generic manufacturers would share in the costs
of generating the data.321 Congress could mandate an "accessing data fee" that
316. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 578 (2009).
317. David B. Ridley et al., Spending on Post-approval Drug Safety, HEALTH AFF. 429, 430-
31, 436 (2006). Other information could include "summary report production of aggregate post-
approval adverse-event information[,] . . . safety surveillance activities, including those related to
post-approval risk management, safety-related product quality complaints, including product recall
for safety reasons, [and] responses to safety questions from worldwide regulators." Id. at 430-31.
318. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 3 (1984).
319. Ridley et al., supra note 317, at 429 ("We surveyed drug manufacturers regarding safety
efforts. Mean spending on postapproval safety per company in 2003 was $56 million (0.3 percent
of sales). Assuming a constant safety-to-sales ratio, we estimated that total spending on post-
approval safety by the top twenty drug manufacturers was $800 million in 2003.").
320. Contract laboratories can perform preclinical and clinical testing, post-approval studies,
and pharmacovigilance aimed at identifying safety signals from all sources. The benefits of contract
laboratories are that some generic manufacturers may not have laboratories or the resources within
their existing laboratories to perform the necessary studies and the contract laboratory may have
expertise that the generic manufacturer lacks. Donald Singer et al., Contract Laboratory
Partnerships: How To Make a Partnership Work With a Contract Pharmaceutical Testing
Laboratory, CONTRACT PHARMA (June 6, 2011), http://www.contractpharma.com/issues/2011-
06/view features/contract-laboratory-partnerships; see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b) (2008).
321. The lack of patent protection in the post-approval world increases brand-name
manufacturer concerns of free riding. Implementing a fee structure for post-approval studies would
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keeps the costs of generic drugs low, compensates brand-name manufacturers for
their data, and prevents generic manufacturers from getting a "free ride." This fee
should not prevent generic manufacturers from offering their products at a lower
cost.
During the pre-approval and post-approval marketing of NDA products, the
brand-name manufacturer and the FDA engage in ongoing conversations and
negotiations regarding safety and labeling. Once the brand-name drug's patent
expires, the regulatory framework should include generic manufacturers in these
discussions. Currently, no process exists for joint consultation and dialogue
among the FDA, the brand-name manufacturer, and generic manufacturers to
discuss appropriate steps or labeling revisions raised in adverse events or post-
approval study results. In the absence of such communications, one questions the
appropriateness of the resulting labeling changes. Generic manufacturers possess
unique insight about the performance of their products and should contribute to
the negotiations with the FDA and brand-name manufacturers regarding all post-
approval labeling changes. Generic manufacturers also should be invited to
consult with the FDA at critical junctures in the ANDA approval process and in
response to adverse event reports.322 These manufacturers are often in the best
position to discover, assess, and take early action to address risks that come to
light after the brand-name drugs patent exclusivity ends, because once generics
become available, generic drug manufacturers often have the majority market
share for the drug.
In addition to direct access to brand-name manufacturers' data, the proposed
framework allows for increased transparency and communication between the
FDA and generic manufacturers. All proposed labeling changes should be sent to
all manufacturers of the product. It is not anticipated that generic manufacturers
merely would be the recipients of increased information. Similar to their branded
counterparts, generic manufacturers should have post-approval responsibilities
requiring them to conduct worldwide literature searches of their product.
It was not Congress' intent for the FDA to carry the burden of ensuring
safety and effectiveness of the pharmaceutical industry alone.323 The current
resource constraints of the FDA only underscore the importance of generic
manufacturers embracing their responsibility to ensure the adequacy of their
products. More transparency in data will allow them to meet the elevated
responsibility, which the Supreme Court assumes belongs to all manufacturers.
These proposals actually align with generic manufacturers' characterization
of their recognized responsibilities. After hearings on the Hatch-Waxman Act,
representatives of the generic drug industry commented on their continuing
alleviate some of these concerns.
322. For a description of bioequivalence studies conducted for ANDA review, see supra
Subsection l.B.1.
323. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 570-71 (2009).
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responsibility after their products' approval. For example, Kenneth Larson, the
Chairman of the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Association, asserted that
generic drug companies were "sensitive to the importance of looking at adverse
reactions."324 He further stated, "generic manufacturers of today will respond to
those needs . . . . [I]f it demands a higher level of knowledge on our part, we are
prepared to meet and respond to the need." 325 In response to the question about
whether the brand-name manufacturers are better able to correct problems than
generic companies, Mr. Larson stated:
I can state for my company as well as I think I can state for the
other generic companies that produce these products, that we
will do and provide whatever is required to be performed to meet
the regulatory requirement to provide for the safety and well-
being of those that are using the drug, this is our role and
responsibility. This is an obligation to be in the business.m
Once brand-name and generic manufacturers are on an equal footing
regarding access to information, the next concern is which mechanisms should be
available to the generic manufacturers to promote changes that will improve the
safety of their labeling. Generic manufacturers require the clear and unequivocal
access to the CBE and Dear Doctor letters processes that are afforded their
brand-name counterparts. For example, brand-name manufacturers typically meet
and discuss proposed warning label changes with the FDA before implementing
them through the CBE process. Generic manufacturers should have a similar
opportunity to not only use the CBE process, but also to discuss proposed
warning labels with the FDA beforehand. The CBE regulation was enacted
because the FDA wanted to provide a mechanism for manufacturers to amend
their labels with new safety information that "required prompt corrective action"
without forcing the products off the market until the FDA approved or rejected
the amended label.327 The intent then was to protect patients.
The Supreme Court reiterated this same goal in Wyeth.328 Accordingly,
consumers and their doctors need the most up-to-date information available.
There is no reason why this same mechanism should not be made available to
generic manufacturers. While generic drugs were not directly referenced in the
324. Hearings on H.R. 1554 and H.R. 3605, supra note 295, at 45.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 47-48; see also id at 50-51 (statement of Bill Haddad, Executive Officer and
President of the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Association) ("We [generic drug companies] also
put our money into research. Every single generic drug company that I know has a large research
staff. It not only researches the drug that they are copying, or bringing into the market but it
researches new drugs, researches adverse reactions.").
327. New Drug and Antibiotic Regulations, 47 Fed. Reg. 46,622, 46,635 (Oct. 19, 1982)
(proposed rule).
328. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 568 (summarizing the intent of 21 C.F.R. §
314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), (C)).
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CBE process, this is only because the CBE regulations were first proposed in
1982,329 two years before the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act
revolutionized the approval, marketing, and affordability of generic drugs.
Therefore, it makes sense to interpret the absence of robust amendment
procedures for generic drug labels as reflecting nothing more than a lack of
foresight. 3 0
Furthermore, despite the truncated nature of generic manufacturers'
responsibilities, there is a strong argument that the regulatory basis for extending
the applicability of the CBE process to generics already exists. Both brand-name
and generic manufacturers are required to comply with regulations designed to
ensure the post-approval safety of their drugs. They must "promptly review all
adverse drug experience information obtained or otherwise received by the
applicant from any source, foreign or domestic, including information derived
from commercial marketing experience, postmarketing clinical investigations,
postmarketing epidemiological surveillance studies, reports in the scientific
literature, and unpublished scientific papers." 3  All reports of a "serious and
unexpected" drug experience must be reported to the FDA within fifteen days
and must be investigated promptly by the manufacturer. 33 2 Manufacturers are
also obligated to submit quarterly adverse reports for the initial three years after
their application (ANDA or NDA) is accepted.3 These regulatory requirements
demonstrate an expectation that generic manufacturers, similar to their branded
counterparts, are to actively participate in postmarket surveillance and take an
active role in enhancing patient safety. The availability of the CBE process and
Dear Doctor letters are vital to accomplishing this goal.
Notwithstanding the articulated tools above, it would be nalve to think that
merely creating a regulatory framework that provides generic manufacturers with
the ability to use the CBE process and send Dear Doctor Letters would
dramatically increase the accuracy and adequacy of generic drug warning labels.
For these measures to have real effect, generic manufacturers must also have an
incentive to use them. As a result of PLIVA, generic manufacturers have no
motivation to ensure that their labels accurately reflect the risks associated with a
given treatment, because they cannot be held accountable if their drugs do not.
Patient safety and generic drug integrity require that generic manufacturers be
saddled with a more robust duty than just to maintain identical warnings labels to
their branded counterpart. To promote accurate labeling, manufacturers must
expeditiously provide full and clear information to physicians and the FDA about
329. Id; see also New Drug and Antibiotic Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7498 (Feb. 22,
1985) (final rule).
330. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417,
98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355) (1984).
331. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(b) (made applicable to ANDA holders by 21 C.F.R. § 98(a)).
332. Id. § 314.80(c)(1)(i)-(ii).
333. Id. § 314.80(c)(2)(i).
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a drug's properties and adverse effects.
State tort liability can provide generic manufacturers the necessary incentive
to fuel the federal regulatory machinery. It also forces generic manufacturers to
produce known safety risk information under the microscope of the adversarial
system. State tort trials help to uncover previously unavailable data on adverse
events, questionable practices by manufacturers, and flaws in regulatory
systems. 334 These suits also serve to facilitate the rapid transmission of
information regarding drug properties. Failure-to-warn suits also provide lawyers
economic incentive to gather information about safety risks that may have been
known to drug manufacturers, but which have not yet been acted on by national
regulatory bodies. Without such litigation, the potential cost to generic
manufacturers of concealing information, which is none, could encourage them
to withhold critical safety information. As noted in literature that traces the social
welfare benefits of dual regulation of risky technologies,3 5 "[t]he common law
system's independence and private incentives to challenge the status quo are
particularly valuable antidotes to complacency and ineffective regulation." 336
Given the FDA's limited capacity to analyze the safety data it receives, state
failure-to-warn suits are critical to support the FDA's regulatory mission. Simply
put, generic manufacturers have sufficient scientific and financial resources to
fulfill the reasonable demands of product liability law and state courts.
Maintaining tort liability is essential to preserving the alignment of
manufacturers' and consumers' interest in full disclosure of evolving risk
information.
The articulation of this framework raises the question, "What about PLIVA?"
Specifically, how does one address the Court's elimination of any generic
manufacturer duty or ability to change its product labeling to protect consumers
against inadequate warnings? Similarly, how could such a framework be
integrated into the Court's elimination of state tort failure-to-warn remedies for
injured consumers harmed by those products? One solution is for the FDA to
amend its labeling rules to eliminate the impossibility identified by the Supreme
Court. In other words, if the FDA were to amend its rules to authorize generic
drug manufacturers to use the CBE regulation in the same manner as brand-name
manufacturers, the federal regulatory basis upon which the Court rested its
impossibility finding would cease to exist. This amendment would eliminate the
bizarre consequences of having inconsistent state law duties for brand-name and
generic manufacturers. Admittedly, however, this could produce a situation
334. Kesselheim & Avorn, supra note 259, at 308-11.
335. See generally C.F. LARRY HEIMANN, ACCEPTABLE RISKS: POLITICS, POLICY, AND RISKY
TECHNOLOGIES (1997); Michael M. Ting, A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy, 47 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 274 (2003).
336. William M. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption and the Floor/Ceiling
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007).
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where consumers are offered multiple labels containing varying safety
requirements for the same product. While this is a departure from the FDA's
desire for uniformity in labels, this approach bolsters consumer safety by
establishing uniformity of manufacturer responsibility. In effect, this places the
responsibility to ensure the safety of a product on its manufacturer. The viability
of bringing a failure-to-warn lawsuit no longer would hinge on the happenstance
of whether the drug was produced by a brand-name or generic manufacturer.
Rather, this approach directly attaches culpability to the manufacturer. Therefore,
the generic or brand-name manufacturer that provides inferior labeling will be a
viable target for a tort claim, precisely because it failed to provide the safest
warning it could have.
Alternatively, Congress could decide to overrule PLIVA by amending the
FDCA to state that neither the Act nor its regulations are intended to preempt
state law. In this regard, the Supreme Court's observations in Wyeth v. Levine are
instructive. The Court noted that Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be the
exclusive means of ensuring drug safety and effectiveness.3 37 In particular,
Congress "determined that widely available state rights of action provided
appropriate relief for injured [drug] consumers" 338 and that "state-law remedies
further consumer protection by motivating manufacturers . . . to give adequate
warnings." 339 Congress could enact legislation making explicit that it considers
"state tort law as complementing, not obstructing, the goals of the FDCA." 34 0
Given that Congress can expressly regulate the dividing line between state and
federal law, and that Congress frequently has invoked such regulatory power in
the past, this could be a viable approach.
It remains an open question which of these two options would be the more
effective route. If the past is any indicator, the FDA alternative may prove to be
more expeditious. Following the Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Riegel v.
Medtronic, 341 in which the Supreme Court held that certain state laws against
medical device manufacturers were expressly preempted by the 1976 Medical
Device Amendments, Congress introduced the Medical Device Safety Act in an
effort to nullify Riegel's effects. To date, however, this legislation has yet to take
effect. Accordingly, if Congress decided to overturn PLIVA, a bill likely would
take years to work its way through the legislative process. Regardless of whether
the solution comes from Congress or the FDA, it is clear that, after PLIVA, some
kind of change is necessary in order to ensure patient safety and the integrity of
generic drug warnings.
337. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574 (2009).
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 612 (8th Cir. 2009).
341. 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
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2. Addressing Anticipated Criticisms
One may anticipate several criticisms of the proposed framework. Under the
current regulatory scheme, it is not unusual for brand-name manufacturers to file
infringement challenges to prevent public disclosure of their NDA data. 342 The
proposed framework's call to provide generic manufacturers with direct access to
NDA information and the results from ongoing clinical trials will trigger
additional proprietary and intellectual property issues that are beyond the scope
of this Article.343 An argument can be made, however, that the proposed
disclosures are in keeping with the intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Section 505
of the FDCA provides that NDA "safety and effectiveness data and information
which has been submitted in an application . . . shall be made available to the
public, upon request." 3 " From this provision, it seems that Congress did not aim
to bar the public from safety and effectiveness data.345 The proposed framework
furthers congressional intent to foster one of Hatch-Waxman's goals of ensuring
the availability of safe and effective generic drugs.346
In response to reinstating tort liability, the Generic Pharmaceutical
Association of American (GPhA) has asserted that increased responsibilities to
monitor the safety of their products would "wipe out" more than one hundred
billion dollars per year in savings under the Hatch-Waxman scheme.347 In making
this argument to the Supreme Court, however, GPhA offered no support to
substantiate the actual costs to generic manufacturers for reporting known health
risks or monitoring widely available public information about a drug. Similarly,
GPhA offered no explanation as to why such responsibilities would be so costly
342. LARS NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY: CASES AND MATERIALS 339
(Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007).
343. For a competent summary, see Holly Soehnge, The Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984: Fine-Tuning the Balance Between the Interests of Pioneer and
Generic Drug Manufacturers, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 51 (2003), which explains the purpose of the
Hatch-Waxman Act as an attempt to correct the perceived imbalances between brand-name
manufacturers and generics, while decrying the abilities of both sides to bypass strictures. See also
Mustafa Onlit, It Is Time: Why the FDA Should Start Disclosing Drug Trial Data, 16 MICH.
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 511 (2010), available at http://www.mttlr.org/volsixteen/unlu.pdf
344. 21 U.S.C. § 355(l)(l)(2006) (emphasis added).
345. In practice, brand-name manufacturers have successfully used the last minute addition of
Section 505's tempering "unless extraordinary circumstances are shown" provision to curtail the
release of research data. James T. O'Reilly, Knowledge Is Power: Legislative Control of Drug
Industry Trade Secrets, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1985) ("Advocates of drug data disclosure acted
quietly in attaching a full disclosure provision, buried amidst many unrelated and controversial
provisions, to the pending legislation."); id. at 18 ("Maneuvering in a minefield of ambiguity and
mutual mistrust, the drafters of the 1984 Act settled upon the term 'extraordinary circumstances' on
the false impression that it represented current FDA policy on data disclosure of live data.").
346. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 9 (1984).
347. Brief of the Generic Pharmaceutical Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 3, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, 09-1501),
2011 WL 343069.
259
HeinOnline  -- 12 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 259 2012
51
Lee: Generic Consumers' Unfortunate Hand
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
as to undermine significantly the current level of savings consumers receive from
the use of generic rather than brand-name drugs.348
Critics may argue that PLIVA merely returns individuals to their pre- Wyeth
position, when the majority of courts held that state law failure-to-warn claims
were preempted. Yet significant changes in the healthcare landscape render these
PLIVA implications far more significant for consumers. Another probable
criticism is that allowing generic manufacturers the ability to strengthen their
labels independently erodes the FDA's mandate of uniformity across brand-name
and generic drugs. Because this uniformity is crucial for public confidence in the
safety and effectiveness of generic drugs, increasing the number of
manufacturers who can unilaterally change their products would undermine the
intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act.349
The issue of uniformity must be re-examined in the wake of PLIVA. The
congressional intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to create a market of generic
drugs equivalent in value to their branded counterparts.3"0 Holding brand-name
and generic manufacturers to the same state law standards directly serves that
aim. For generics to succeed, they must have equal value to branded drugs. In
economic terms, they must be perfect substitutes, and, in safety terms, this
requires a duty to disclose risks equal to that of its branded drug. A critical
component of the value equation for any product is a consumer's recourse in the
event the product is defective. Products sold "as is" are less valuable than one
sold with an implied warranty of fitness and merchantability. Similarly, a product
sold without a preemption of state law tort claim is more valuable than one sold
with such a preemption. Barring a consumer from pursuing a product liability
claim against a generic manufacturer, but not a brand-name manufacturer,
undermines the goal of uniform value between generic and brand-name drugs. 31
A basic economic tenant is that the cost of accidents is lessened when
society imposes such costs on "the 'cheapest cost avoider' or [the actor] who is in
the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and
accident avoidance costs and to act on that decision once it is made." 3 52 The
Supreme Court endorsed this finding in Wyeth v. Levine, by holding that
pharmaceutical manufacturers "have superior access to information about their
348.Id
349. See, e.g., Facts and Myths About Generic Drugs, FDA (last updated June 22, 2012)
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/Understandi
ngGenericDrugs/ucm 167991 .htm.
350. See Brief of Rep. Henry A. Waxman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents
Urging Affirmance at 8, PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, 09-1501), 2011 WL
794113.
35 1. Id.
352. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 548 (N.J. 1982) (citing Guido
Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strcit Liablity in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972)).
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drugs, especially in the post-marketing phase as new risks emerge," 353 and that
"state-law remedies further consumer protection by motivating manufacturers to
produce safe and effective drugs and to give adequate warnings."354 Uniformity
necessitates this same standard be applied to generic manufacturers.
Under the current regulatory scheme, generic manufacturers do not make
label modifications until the FDA approves the proposed label (whether through
the CBE or some other process). 3 55 As previously mentioned, it is a common
practice for brand-name manufacturers to consult with the FDA prior to making
these proposed changes.3 56 Giving generic manufacturers access to the same CBE
change consultation process, and not requiring any industry-wide change in the
generic or brand-name drug until the FDA approves the change, addresses many
of the uniformity and consumer confidence concerns that critics may raise.357
Essentially, the proposed framework expands the process the FDA uses to notify
generic manufacturers of changes made to their branded counterpart to now
include notifying the brand-name manufacturer of required changes originally
proposed by their generic counterpart. To be clear, it is not the intent of this
Article to take exception to the Supreme Court's preemption and validity of the
impossibility defense analysis. Rather, this Article addresses the adequacy of a
regulatory framework that contributed to the Supreme Court's ruling and the
resultant safety implications for consumers.
3. Reconciling the Proposed Framework with the Intent of the Hatch-
Waxman Act
A major challenge to the proposed framework is balancing two of the Hatch-
Waxman Act's primary goals: increasing the availability of quality medical care
and lowering the cost of generic drugs. 3 58 In determining how that balance should
be struck, Hatch-Waxman must be read in the context of the FDCA, which it
amends. The purpose of the FDCA is to protect the public health and "assure the
safety, effectiveness, and reliability of drugs."3 59 As the Supreme Court
succinctly noted, "Congress enacted the FDCA to bolster consumer protection
against harmful products." 360 Nothing in the Hatch-Waxman Act suggests that
Congress intended to abandon that position. Similarly, there is no evidence that,
when Congress passed Hatch-Waxman, "it intended the goal of delivering low-
353. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 578-79 (2009).
354. Id. at 574.
355. See infra Subsection I.B.2.
356. Gilhooley, supra note 6, at 551.
357. The FDA could even consider expanding these pre-CBE change consultations to include
both generic and brand-name manufacturers.
358. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355) (1984).
359. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962).
360. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574 (2009).
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cost generic drugs to supplant the FDCA's overall goal of providing consumers
with safe and effective drugs., 36 1 Accordingly, while Hatch-Waxman sought to
quickly make low-cost generic drugs more accessible, it did not pursue this goal
at all costs. 3 62 To impute such a single-minded cost focus into Hatch-Waxman
would give short shrift to Congress' purpose of consumer safety.363 Isolating the
Hatch-Waxman Act from the entirety of FDCA would violate the basic principle
that statutes should be read as a whole. The Hatch-Waxman Act's success rests in
large part on the assurance of "sameness" between brand-name and generic
drugs. The ANDA system, which streamlined the process for initially bringing
generic drugs to market, is premised on this very idea. This "sameness" principle
however, does not mean that generics are to be sold without regard for whether
consumers are properly warned about serious risks. 364 Rather, this core
''sameness" principle requires generic and brand-name manufacturers to be held
to the same post-approval standards. For example, brand-name and generic
manufacturers often receive important safety information once their drugs are on
the market. They should be treated the same with respect to their responsibility to
bring that relevant data to the FDA's attention. They also should have the same
access to regulatory mechanisms to strengthen their products' warning labels to
ensure patient safety. Finally, any violation of the standards should be addressed
with the same tort liability.
Simply put, requiring generic and brand-name manufacturers to bear the
same level of responsibility for ensuring the safety of their products is directly in
line with the intent of Hatch-Waxman Act. The solution proposed by this
framework embraces the spirit of Hatch-Waxman disclosure provisions by
providing generic manufacturers with direct access to the data necessary to craft
adequate labeling changes.
CONCLUSION
The issue of whether the current regulatory framework adequately promotes
safe and effective generic drugs has gotten lost amid state law failure-to-warn
litigation. PLIVA effectively called a halt to circuits shoehorning generic
manufacturers' regulatory responsibilities into a Wyeth analysis. In doing so, the
Supreme Court clarified, for courts and consumers alike, "that federal statutes
and regulations that apply to brand-name drug manufacturers are meaningfully
361. Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharm. Co., 630 F.3d 1225, 1395 (9th Cir. 2011).
362. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984).
363. See 130 CONG. REC. 15847 (June 12, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("This is a good
bill. Without compromising the public safety or welfare in the least it will significantly lower the
price of off-patent drugs, by many times in some cases, through increased generic competition.")
(emphasis added).
364. See State Consumer Education Efforts, GENERIC PHARM. Ass'N (GPHA),
http://www.gphaonline.org/issues/state-consumer-education-efforts (last visited Aug. 1, 2012).
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different than those that apply to generic drug manufacturers." 3 65 According to
the Court, these differences have divergent safety and legal implications for
consumers. For example, these differences preempt the ability of generic drug
consumers to sue generic manufactures for failure to warn. They also prohibit
generic manufacturers from taking any steps to strengthen inadequate warning
labels unilaterally or to disseminate publicly additional warnings on their own.
Given that generic drugs constitute seventy-five percent of all prescriptions in the
United States, the Court's ruling has broad implications. By immunizing generic
manufacturers against state law failure-to-warn claims, the Court arguably has
reduced the incentive of generic manufacturers to provide comprehensive
information about their products' properties and associated risks. Generic
manufacturers also may have less incentive to fulfill their duty to propose label
changes under FDA regulations. All of these responsibilities are necessary
components in ensuring that labels accurately reflect the risks associated with
them. Without these controls, consumers may lose confidence in generic drugs
and physicians may be reluctant to prescribe them. Additionally, as protectors of
the health and welfare of their citizenry, states may reassess substitution laws.
Despite key differences between the labeling frameworks for brand-name
and generic manufacturers, the PLIVA analysis loses sight of the most essential
function of drug regulation: consumer safety. In the Court's finding of
"impossibility," it essentially abandons a central premise of drug regulations. The
framework advanced by this Article addresses what PLIVA neglected. While
incorporating the unique role generic drugs play in the American healthcare
system, this Article advances a framework that remains committed to Hatch-
Waxman's goals of providing safe, but less expensive, generic drugs. This is
achieved through regulations that provide all manufacturers with increased
access to data pertaining to the safety of their drugs. It also offers a structure for
open communication among generic manufacturers, their branded counterparts,
and the FDA. Finally, the framework grants generic manufacturers unambiguous
access to label-changing mechanisms that are available to brand-name
manufacturers.
365. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2582 (2011).
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